I don’t see how either or both options you’ve presented change the point in any way; if politicians claim to agree on X until you agree to vote for them, then turn out to revert to their personal preference once you’ve already voted for them, then while you may know they’re mutable or a best-effort-compromise, you’ve still agreed with a politician and voted for them on the basis of X, which they now no longer hold.
That they are known to have mutable stances or be prone to hidden agendas only makes this tactic more visible, but also more popular, and by selection effects makes the more dangerous instances of this even more subtle and, well, dangerous.
I would argue that the chief difference between picking a politician to support and choosing answers based on one’s personal views of morality is that the former is self-evidently mutable. If a survey-taker was informed beforehand that the survey-giver might or might not change his responses, it is highly doubtful the study in question would have these results.
I don’t see how either or both options you’ve presented change the point in any way; if politicians claim to agree on X until you agree to vote for them, then turn out to revert to their personal preference once you’ve already voted for them, then while you may know they’re mutable or a best-effort-compromise, you’ve still agreed with a politician and voted for them on the basis of X, which they now no longer hold.
That they are known to have mutable stances or be prone to hidden agendas only makes this tactic more visible, but also more popular, and by selection effects makes the more dangerous instances of this even more subtle and, well, dangerous.
I would argue that the chief difference between picking a politician to support and choosing answers based on one’s personal views of morality is that the former is self-evidently mutable. If a survey-taker was informed beforehand that the survey-giver might or might not change his responses, it is highly doubtful the study in question would have these results.