Could you elaborate on why you believe this to be the case?
Have you read the fun theory sequence? If you have and think it isn’t relevant, then I misunderstand your point here to a greater degree than I thought. If you haven’t read it then go read it.
I wrote a great deal more in providing a definition of the term than just those two sentences. About a third of the effort invested in the article was in fleshing out that definition.
From the next paragraph: “I intentionally refrain from defining what form that optimization takes...”
But one must always start somewhere, when introducing a new term. So if it was your goal to introduce the term, how would you start it?
I still don’t understand what you’re trying to say, so I can’t really answer this.
Have you read the fun theory sequence? If you have and think it isn’t relevant, then I misunderstand your point here to a greater degree than I thought. If you haven’t read it then go read it.
I haven’t read it deeply. I was hoping to get insight as to how you feel it should “interact”. It is entirely plausible that I may incorporate elements of said sequence into the body of lore of acrohumanism. I will note that from what I myself have seen, there is a categorical difference between “being free to optimize” and having optimization itself as a higher-order goal. (Part of this is possibly resultant from my having a low value on hedonism in general, which seems to be a primary focus of the Fun Theory sequence. I would even go so far as to state that my idea of acrohumanism would have anti-hedonistic results: it takes as a given the notion that one should never be satisfied with where he currently is on his personal optimization track; that he should be permanently dissatisfied.)
From the next paragraph: “I intentionally refrain from defining what form that optimization takes...”
Indeed. But I also gave several examples of what I meant by the term, and I associated it with other specific notions: transhumanism / posthumanism—from these contextually my meaning should be obvious enough.
This is a point, however, I freely recognize I am currently weak on. I do not—morally cannot—assert that I am fit to determine what universally optimal would be for all persons. But I do not believe that optimization itself—augmentation of the self to within whatever tolerance-limits our biological frailties limit us—is an impossible topic.
I still don’t understand what you’re trying to say, so I can’t really answer this.
Fair enough. Are there any specific points you believe I could clarify?
Have you read the fun theory sequence? If you have and think it isn’t relevant, then I misunderstand your point here to a greater degree than I thought. If you haven’t read it then go read it.
From the next paragraph: “I intentionally refrain from defining what form that optimization takes...”
I still don’t understand what you’re trying to say, so I can’t really answer this.
I haven’t read it deeply. I was hoping to get insight as to how you feel it should “interact”. It is entirely plausible that I may incorporate elements of said sequence into the body of lore of acrohumanism. I will note that from what I myself have seen, there is a categorical difference between “being free to optimize” and having optimization itself as a higher-order goal. (Part of this is possibly resultant from my having a low value on hedonism in general, which seems to be a primary focus of the Fun Theory sequence. I would even go so far as to state that my idea of acrohumanism would have anti-hedonistic results: it takes as a given the notion that one should never be satisfied with where he currently is on his personal optimization track; that he should be permanently dissatisfied.)
Indeed. But I also gave several examples of what I meant by the term, and I associated it with other specific notions: transhumanism / posthumanism—from these contextually my meaning should be obvious enough.
This is a point, however, I freely recognize I am currently weak on. I do not—morally cannot—assert that I am fit to determine what universally optimal would be for all persons. But I do not believe that optimization itself—augmentation of the self to within whatever tolerance-limits our biological frailties limit us—is an impossible topic.
Fair enough. Are there any specific points you believe I could clarify?