EDIT: This theory does not sufficiently address the heart of the issue, and needs to be reconsidered.
Perhaps this knot can be cut with PCT. Suppose you have the following hypothesis:
“The executive function sequences actions so as to minimize the error signal from mental subsystems”.
This seems to explain most of the things you’re trying to resolve. For instance:
-Crossing the street to avoid the homeless man minimizes the errors from the “maximize my amount of money”, “avoid socially awkward situations”, and “maximize my self image as a charitable person” subsystems.
-Self-handicapping minimizes the errors from “maximize my self image as talented” and “maximize my appearance to others as talented” (the reason this occurs relatively infrequently is that it’s probably somewhat difficult to decouple these subsystems from other ones that may “override” them with stronger error signals”)
This hypothesis has the benefit of being rooted in a conceptualization that we’re pretty sure is right (executive function and a large number of mental modules), and not relying on the extremely fuzzy conscious vs unconscious dichotomy.
Of course, there’s a big giant risk of coming up with evolutionary style “just-so” stories in the form of mental modules for every possible behavior, but that doesn’t seem insurmountable.
Your error minimizer hypothesis doesn’t say anything about why we sometimes genuinely believe that we have a certain goal and then act in a way that’s aimed at a completely different, sometimes contradictory, goal.
The U vs. C hypothesis explains that by proposing a different model: two different satisfcation maximizers (or I guess error minimizers, it comes down to the same result) with different amounts of influence over different, but somewhat overlapping, categories of action. The goals of C will not necessarily be fulfilled by U, and vice-versa, explaining why our bodies sometimes do things that contradict with what C, the part of ourselves with primary responsibility for self-reflection on goals and writing comments on Internet blogs, wants.
I don’t know if the OP necessarily has the best explanation for this phenomenon, but the error minimizing executive function doesn’t explain it at all, I think.
EDIT: This theory does not sufficiently address the heart of the issue, and needs to be reconsidered.
Perhaps this knot can be cut with PCT. Suppose you have the following hypothesis:
“The executive function sequences actions so as to minimize the error signal from mental subsystems”.
This seems to explain most of the things you’re trying to resolve. For instance:
-Crossing the street to avoid the homeless man minimizes the errors from the “maximize my amount of money”, “avoid socially awkward situations”, and “maximize my self image as a charitable person” subsystems.
-Self-handicapping minimizes the errors from “maximize my self image as talented” and “maximize my appearance to others as talented” (the reason this occurs relatively infrequently is that it’s probably somewhat difficult to decouple these subsystems from other ones that may “override” them with stronger error signals”)
This hypothesis has the benefit of being rooted in a conceptualization that we’re pretty sure is right (executive function and a large number of mental modules), and not relying on the extremely fuzzy conscious vs unconscious dichotomy.
Of course, there’s a big giant risk of coming up with evolutionary style “just-so” stories in the form of mental modules for every possible behavior, but that doesn’t seem insurmountable.
Are there any obvious problems with this?
Your error minimizer hypothesis doesn’t say anything about why we sometimes genuinely believe that we have a certain goal and then act in a way that’s aimed at a completely different, sometimes contradictory, goal.
The U vs. C hypothesis explains that by proposing a different model: two different satisfcation maximizers (or I guess error minimizers, it comes down to the same result) with different amounts of influence over different, but somewhat overlapping, categories of action. The goals of C will not necessarily be fulfilled by U, and vice-versa, explaining why our bodies sometimes do things that contradict with what C, the part of ourselves with primary responsibility for self-reflection on goals and writing comments on Internet blogs, wants.
I don’t know if the OP necessarily has the best explanation for this phenomenon, but the error minimizing executive function doesn’t explain it at all, I think.
Fair point—this doesn’t address the heart of the issue. I’ll mull it over and see if the concept can’t be salvaged.