Of course you can simply say, without argument, “I believe everything is physical, including mental and abstract objects. I have no justification for this, like in form of a reductive explanation. I just intuitively believe it is true.” But that statement alone would not be a theory of physicalism, and few philosophers would be interested in your belief. It is simply far from obvious, for most people, that abstract and mental objects are physical. They are not obviously located in space and time, and they do not obviously have causal powers, at least not in the standard picture of physics. Asserting physicalism therefore requires an argument.
So, considering that non-obviousness of physicality of mental objects is not grounded in rigorous argument, the real requirement is not logical reduction but just persuasion of philosophers, right? And there is enough argument in predicting physical world to a much higher precision than philosophers can discriminate their mental objects with, combined with using, for example, Strawson’s arguments for panpsychism, for illustrating the possibility of identifying what people call the mental properties with physical objects at all. So the way I see it there is physicalist theory (with equations and all that) that predicts all things that physicalists want to call the mental properties, that also predicts that non-physicalist theories are less sure about specific mental properties, and there are arguments for why non-physicalists should identify their mental properties with physicalist mental properties. Which is enough to consider the problem solved.
there is physicalist theory (with equations and all that) that predicts all things that physicalists want to call the mental properties
Well...no, there isn’t a physical theory or equation that predicts what red looks like. If there were, it would be unreasonable to dispute physicalism.
or example, Strawson’s arguments for panpsychism, for illustrating the possibility of identifying what people call the mental properties with physical objects at all.
If you need to bring in a non-physicalist philosophical theory to identify physical and mental properties, then the physics isn’t doing all the lifting, and you don’t really have an argument for physicalism. If that’s what you are saying.
I’m saying panpsychism/monism or whatever you want to call it is physicalist worldview. Because physicalists do say that things really exist and arguments for why “such and such neural processes” are equivalent to “I am seeing red” are not part of the theory—they’re just explanation for intuitions. So yes, it’s unreasonable to reject physicalism when it predicts neural processes that you describe as “I’m seeing red” because they are the same thing under panpsychist view as much as “it’a a rock” and “it’s heap of atoms” describe the same thing.
I’m saying panpsychism/monism or whatever you want to call it is physicalist worldview
It isn’t generally considered to be.
Because physicalists do say that things really exist
That isn’t the central or characteristic claim of realism. You can’t say that panpsychism is identical to physicalism just because they both agree on the real existence of external objects. If that’s what you are saying.
and arguments for why “such and such neural processes” are equivalent to “I am seeing red” are not part of the theory
And that’s a bad thing. Physicalism isn’t absolved from explaining qualia on the basis that it isn’t even trying to. The correct theory is the theory that explains all the evidence, not the one that only explains a subset.
There is a physical explanation of how a heap of atoms amounts to a rock, but there is not of how a neural activation pattern amounts to a quale.
Intuitions as opposed to what?
because they are the same thing under panpsychist view as much as “it’a a rock” and “it’s heap of atoms” describe the same thing
But the identity is not itself physically explained! There is a physical explanation of how a heap of atoms amounts to a rock, but there is not of how a neural activation pattern amounts to a quale.
Physicalism and reductionism are about explanation. Physicalism is the claim that everything is in principle predictable from physics. If there is one fact, entity or property that is not, physicalism is false. So if there is no explanation of how a neural activation pattern amounts to a quale, if it’s a “brute fact” , then physicalism is false.
But the identity is not itself physically explained! There is a physical explanation of how a heap of atoms amounts to a rock, but there is not of how a neural activation pattern amounts to a quale.
There are no strictly physical explanations of how a heap of atoms amounts to a rock. Because rocks are human abstraction. Conversely, there are non-strictly physical (maybe sometimes hypothetical, because neuroscience is not yet there) explanations of how specific neural activation patterns amount to specific qualia. The only objection to this is “things you explaining can’t possibly be real qualia, because zombies, and real qualia are obviously real”. And that is solved by panpsychism—atoms can amount to qualia because everything has qualia/existence matches all intuitions about qualia—and weak illusionism about everything else—specific qualia are less obvious than current science can do about neural processes. So the only “brute fact” that is needed is “these equations describe reality” and this is a physical fact. Do you/philosophical consensus disagree with “existence matches all intuitions about qualia” or what?
It isn’t generally considered to be.
I mean there are certainly varieties that are not physicalist, but if it’s just “these equations describe reality” and “existence matches all intuitions about qualia”, why shouldn’t it considered to be physicalist?
You can’t say that panpsychism is identical to physicalism just because they both agree on the real existence of external objects. If that’s what you are saying.
I’m saying that panpsychism doesn’t describe anything additional to physicalism—existence is already a thing in physicalism, so, like any reduction of qualia to physical objects, panpsychism does not become unphysical just because it talks about physical things people call “qualia”.
There are no strictly physical explanations of how a heap of atoms amounts to a rock. Because rocks are human abstraction.
That’s setting the bar rather high. Physicalism is usually only required to explain higher level concepts where they are a given.
I’m saying that panpsychism doesn’t describe anything additional to physicalism
Which gives you physicalist ontology at best. But physicalism also has an epistemological definition; all facts are physical facts. The idea that qualia amount to physics does not have a physical explanation, and is not predicted by physics.
The validity of the idea that qualia amount to physics is explained by the same kind of a physical explanation as in the case of an idea that a heap of atoms amounts to a rock—panpsychism is just a bridge law. Physics predicts existence the same way it predicts atoms, so we say that physics predicts qulia the same way it predicts rocks. What’s the relevant difference between “what you called a rock is actually atoms” and “what you called consciousness is actually existence” that makes latter unphysical?
Your original claim was more like qualia are atoms. You seem to have switched to talking about consciousness in a more general sense, whilst also switching to saying it equates to existence in general. But neither claim is a prediction of physics, anyway.
Panpsychism standardly states that all entities have irreducibly mental properties. That’s clearly in contrast to the physicalist claim that all properties reduce to physical properties.
Dual aspect theory theory asserts an equivalence between physical states and conscious states, but is unable to say which is fundamental , which is why “dual aspect” is generally coupled to “neutral monism”.
I guess “atoms can amount to qualia” was misleading, but I meant that you can describe human qualia using atoms, and that description would be as correct, as describing rock as heap of atoms would, and more complete than “I am seeing red”. The switch to “consciousness” was to prevent conflating specific qualia, that are not fundamental, with quale of universe.
But neither claim is a prediction of physics, anyway.
Only in the same sense that “rocks are atoms” is not a prediction of physics.
Panpsychism standardly states that all entities have irreducibly mental properties.
Panpsychism that works (Russelian monism or whatever you want to call the one from http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf) states that all entities have one property that you can call mental—existence—and there is only one entity, because that is how actual physics works. And that property is also implicitly present in physicalism.
If dual aspect says that physical description is complete, even though you can describe things differently, then physics predicts that and you don’t need dual aspect. Is it says that physical description is incomplete, then I disagree and want to know what’s its objection to the kind of panpsychism I’m talking about.
Well, no, in practice you can’t describe a specific quale by describing a specific configuration of atoms (as in Mary’s Room). If you could, there would be no hard problem.
and that description would be as correct, as describing rock as heap of atoms would,
You can give microphysical explanation of a rock , once you input “rock” as a human concept. The same does not work for “red”.
The switch to “consciousness” was to prevent conflating specific qualia, that are not fundamental, with quale of universe.
Whats the quale of the universe?
states that all entities have one property that you can call mental—existence—and there is only one entity, because that is how actual physics works.
I didn’t notice either idea being mentioned in the paper you linked.
Also, Chalmers seems conflicted about whether panpsychism is physicalism.
“In particular, constitutive Russellian
panpsychism is incompatible with narrow physicalism, but it is a form of broad physicalism. ”
If dual aspect says that physical description is complete, even though you can describe things differently, then physics predicts that and you don’t need dual aspect
For what? Physics can allow you to predict external.events, but predicts nothing about how things seem to you.
Dual aspect theory allows you to account for consciousness, without dismissing it ,and without embracing full dualism with its attendant problems.
You can give microphysical explanation of a rock , once you input “rock” as a human concept. The same does not work for “red”.
It does work if on the last step where someone will say “but these firing neurons are not actually my seeing of red!” you also input arguments for panpsychism. They are the same kind of explanation, so panpsychism can in principle solve the hard problem. So if you disagree you have to disagree with something specific about panpsychism.
Well, no, in practice you can’t describe a specific quale by describing a specific configuration of atoms (as in Mary’s Room). If you could, there would be no hard problem.
So now that you can, yes, the hard problem is solved.
Whats the quale of the universe?
I mean that actual physics doesn’t include fundamental division of universe into parts, so the most precise description of qualia is description of the quale of the universe. And that description is the same as physical description of the state of the universe. Or do you want me to say things that would result in non-verbal thoughts/feelings in you that you would judge as similar to the state of universe? Because that would depend on your judgement.
Of course you can simply say, without argument, “I believe everything is physical, including mental and abstract objects. I have no justification for this, like in form of a reductive explanation. I just intuitively believe it is true.” But that statement alone would not be a theory of physicalism, and few philosophers would be interested in your belief. It is simply far from obvious, for most people, that abstract and mental objects are physical. They are not obviously located in space and time, and they do not obviously have causal powers, at least not in the standard picture of physics. Asserting physicalism therefore requires an argument.
So, considering that non-obviousness of physicality of mental objects is not grounded in rigorous argument, the real requirement is not logical reduction but just persuasion of philosophers, right? And there is enough argument in predicting physical world to a much higher precision than philosophers can discriminate their mental objects with, combined with using, for example, Strawson’s arguments for panpsychism, for illustrating the possibility of identifying what people call the mental properties with physical objects at all. So the way I see it there is physicalist theory (with equations and all that) that predicts all things that physicalists want to call the mental properties, that also predicts that non-physicalist theories are less sure about specific mental properties, and there are arguments for why non-physicalists should identify their mental properties with physicalist mental properties. Which is enough to consider the problem solved.
Well...no, there isn’t a physical theory or equation that predicts what red looks like. If there were, it would be unreasonable to dispute physicalism.
If you need to bring in a non-physicalist philosophical theory to identify physical and mental properties, then the physics isn’t doing all the lifting, and you don’t really have an argument for physicalism. If that’s what you are saying.
I’m saying panpsychism/monism or whatever you want to call it is physicalist worldview. Because physicalists do say that things really exist and arguments for why “such and such neural processes” are equivalent to “I am seeing red” are not part of the theory—they’re just explanation for intuitions. So yes, it’s unreasonable to reject physicalism when it predicts neural processes that you describe as “I’m seeing red” because they are the same thing under panpsychist view as much as “it’a a rock” and “it’s heap of atoms” describe the same thing.
It isn’t generally considered to be.
That isn’t the central or characteristic claim of realism. You can’t say that panpsychism is identical to physicalism just because they both agree on the real existence of external objects. If that’s what you are saying.
And that’s a bad thing. Physicalism isn’t absolved from explaining qualia on the basis that it isn’t even trying to. The correct theory is the theory that explains all the evidence, not the one that only explains a subset.
Intuitions as opposed to what?
But the identity is not itself physically explained! There is a physical explanation of how a heap of atoms amounts to a rock, but there is not of how a neural activation pattern amounts to a quale.
Physicalism and reductionism are about explanation. Physicalism is the claim that everything is in principle predictable from physics. If there is one fact, entity or property that is not, physicalism is false. So if there is no explanation of how a neural activation pattern amounts to a quale, if it’s a “brute fact” , then physicalism is false.
There are no strictly physical explanations of how a heap of atoms amounts to a rock. Because rocks are human abstraction. Conversely, there are non-strictly physical (maybe sometimes hypothetical, because neuroscience is not yet there) explanations of how specific neural activation patterns amount to specific qualia. The only objection to this is “things you explaining can’t possibly be real qualia, because zombies, and real qualia are obviously real”. And that is solved by panpsychism—atoms can amount to qualia because everything has qualia/existence matches all intuitions about qualia—and weak illusionism about everything else—specific qualia are less obvious than current science can do about neural processes. So the only “brute fact” that is needed is “these equations describe reality” and this is a physical fact. Do you/philosophical consensus disagree with “existence matches all intuitions about qualia” or what?
I mean there are certainly varieties that are not physicalist, but if it’s just “these equations describe reality” and “existence matches all intuitions about qualia”, why shouldn’t it considered to be physicalist?
I’m saying that panpsychism doesn’t describe anything additional to physicalism—existence is already a thing in physicalism, so, like any reduction of qualia to physical objects, panpsychism does not become unphysical just because it talks about physical things people call “qualia”.
That’s setting the bar rather high. Physicalism is usually only required to explain higher level concepts where they are a given.
Which gives you physicalist ontology at best. But physicalism also has an epistemological definition; all facts are physical facts. The idea that qualia amount to physics does not have a physical explanation, and is not predicted by physics.
The validity of the idea that qualia amount to physics is explained by the same kind of a physical explanation as in the case of an idea that a heap of atoms amounts to a rock—panpsychism is just a bridge law. Physics predicts existence the same way it predicts atoms, so we say that physics predicts qulia the same way it predicts rocks. What’s the relevant difference between “what you called a rock is actually atoms” and “what you called consciousness is actually existence” that makes latter unphysical?
Your original claim was more like qualia are atoms. You seem to have switched to talking about consciousness in a more general sense, whilst also switching to saying it equates to existence in general. But neither claim is a prediction of physics, anyway.
Panpsychism standardly states that all entities have irreducibly mental properties. That’s clearly in contrast to the physicalist claim that all properties reduce to physical properties.
Dual aspect theory theory asserts an equivalence between physical states and conscious states, but is unable to say which is fundamental , which is why “dual aspect” is generally coupled to “neutral monism”.
I guess “atoms can amount to qualia” was misleading, but I meant that you can describe human qualia using atoms, and that description would be as correct, as describing rock as heap of atoms would, and more complete than “I am seeing red”. The switch to “consciousness” was to prevent conflating specific qualia, that are not fundamental, with quale of universe.
Only in the same sense that “rocks are atoms” is not a prediction of physics.
Panpsychism that works (Russelian monism or whatever you want to call the one from http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf) states that all entities have one property that you can call mental—existence—and there is only one entity, because that is how actual physics works. And that property is also implicitly present in physicalism.
If dual aspect says that physical description is complete, even though you can describe things differently, then physics predicts that and you don’t need dual aspect. Is it says that physical description is incomplete, then I disagree and want to know what’s its objection to the kind of panpsychism I’m talking about.
Well, no, in practice you can’t describe a specific quale by describing a specific configuration of atoms (as in Mary’s Room). If you could, there would be no hard problem.
You can give microphysical explanation of a rock , once you input “rock” as a human concept. The same does not work for “red”.
Whats the quale of the universe?
I didn’t notice either idea being mentioned in the paper you linked.
Also, Chalmers seems conflicted about whether panpsychism is physicalism.
“In particular, constitutive Russellian panpsychism is incompatible with narrow physicalism, but it is a form of broad physicalism. ”
For what? Physics can allow you to predict external.events, but predicts nothing about how things seem to you. Dual aspect theory allows you to account for consciousness, without dismissing it ,and without embracing full dualism with its attendant problems.
How is that conflicted when broad physicalism is physicalism?
Right, sorry, it was another one where it’s called cosmopsychism: http://consc.net/papers/combination.pdf.
It does work if on the last step where someone will say “but these firing neurons are not actually my seeing of red!” you also input arguments for panpsychism. They are the same kind of explanation, so panpsychism can in principle solve the hard problem. So if you disagree you have to disagree with something specific about panpsychism.
So now that you can, yes, the hard problem is solved.
I mean that actual physics doesn’t include fundamental division of universe into parts, so the most precise description of qualia is description of the quale of the universe. And that description is the same as physical description of the state of the universe. Or do you want me to say things that would result in non-verbal thoughts/feelings in you that you would judge as similar to the state of universe? Because that would depend on your judgement.