The third one isn’t strictly required, but you would probably see it if this version of the anthropic principle were at work, and so if you didn’t see this, it would be strong counter-evidence.
The second assumption is required because when you’re doing anthropic reasoning, you are essentially performing a bayesian update in response to the evidence that you are alive and performing a bayesian update. If this is more likely given some hypothesis than another. And P(I am alive| The FTW machine destroys the universe) ~= P(I am alive | The FTW machine does not destroy the universe), until the point at which the FTW machine would be built. (This was briefly alluded to in the post, with the line “Does this mean we can foresee executing a future probability update, but can’t go ahead and update now?”)
The FTW Machine wasn’t built last week, because I had a cold. It wasn’t built the week before, because… &etc.
This means that if I continue to procrastinate for more and more unlikely reasons, then I have evidence that cleaning off my desk destroys the universe?
This means that if I continue to procrastinate for more and more unlikely reasons, then I have evidence that cleaning off my desk destroys the universe?
Well, yes but.
Because really, you continuing to procrastinate for more and more unlikely (stated) reasons is also evidence that superintelligent dolphins living on Venus are employing mind control to prevent you from cleaning off your desk, in order to further their nefarious schemes against the wild fleets of caribou on Mercury. This hypothesis does increase in probability, but there’s a hypothesis with a much higher prior probability (you’re just lazy) which will always dominate it. It counts as evidence, but on its own, it’s never going to become a hypothesis likely enough to warrant serious consideration.
Going back to the original point: Why do breakdowns of the LHC provide evidence that the LHC destroys the universe? The ‘destroys the universe’ hypothesis gains no ground on the ‘sabotage’ hypothesis nor the ‘engineers building something for the first time ever make errors’ hypothesis.
The only thing it does is falsify the ‘Everything goes off without a hitch’ hypothesis, and makes the set of ‘everything goes off with n or fewer hitches’ hypotheses less likely.
Unless the breakdowns are such that they would be unlikely under those hypotheses, they don’t gain ground. I do seem to recall hearing something once about a sandwich getting dropped into a piece of the apparatus, which screwed things up for a while. That may not have actually happened, but that’s the sort of event that would (under certain versions of the anthropic principle) provide evidence that the LHC destroys the world.
ADDITION: It would also be strong evidence if the LHC suffered these sorts of breakdowns when we attempted certain types of collisions, but not others.
The third one isn’t strictly required, but you would probably see it if this version of the anthropic principle were at work, and so if you didn’t see this, it would be strong counter-evidence.
The second assumption is required because when you’re doing anthropic reasoning, you are essentially performing a bayesian update in response to the evidence that you are alive and performing a bayesian update. If this is more likely given some hypothesis than another. And P(I am alive| The FTW machine destroys the universe) ~= P(I am alive | The FTW machine does not destroy the universe), until the point at which the FTW machine would be built. (This was briefly alluded to in the post, with the line “Does this mean we can foresee executing a future probability update, but can’t go ahead and update now?”)
The FTW Machine wasn’t built last week, because I had a cold. It wasn’t built the week before, because… &etc.
This means that if I continue to procrastinate for more and more unlikely reasons, then I have evidence that cleaning off my desk destroys the universe?
Well, yes but.
Because really, you continuing to procrastinate for more and more unlikely (stated) reasons is also evidence that superintelligent dolphins living on Venus are employing mind control to prevent you from cleaning off your desk, in order to further their nefarious schemes against the wild fleets of caribou on Mercury. This hypothesis does increase in probability, but there’s a hypothesis with a much higher prior probability (you’re just lazy) which will always dominate it. It counts as evidence, but on its own, it’s never going to become a hypothesis likely enough to warrant serious consideration.
Going back to the original point: Why do breakdowns of the LHC provide evidence that the LHC destroys the universe? The ‘destroys the universe’ hypothesis gains no ground on the ‘sabotage’ hypothesis nor the ‘engineers building something for the first time ever make errors’ hypothesis.
The only thing it does is falsify the ‘Everything goes off without a hitch’ hypothesis, and makes the set of ‘everything goes off with n or fewer hitches’ hypotheses less likely.
Unless the breakdowns are such that they would be unlikely under those hypotheses, they don’t gain ground. I do seem to recall hearing something once about a sandwich getting dropped into a piece of the apparatus, which screwed things up for a while. That may not have actually happened, but that’s the sort of event that would (under certain versions of the anthropic principle) provide evidence that the LHC destroys the world.
ADDITION: It would also be strong evidence if the LHC suffered these sorts of breakdowns when we attempted certain types of collisions, but not others.