I believe your second use of the word “the” above is a mistake. Maybe I misunderstood the utility-correction idea, but it seemed to me it was about individual human lives, not acts by agents who might create lives. There is the act of reproduction, but there is (at the time of decision) no such thing as the child.
Sure, but if you interpret your principle that way, I think it loses some plausibility in the original context of average vs total utilitarianism (etc.). When B is a variable ranging over different people, it’s no longer so plausible that we should be indifferent when the expected personal utility for B is zero.
The correction is the expected utility of the child, not the actual utility.
I believe your second use of the word “the” above is a mistake. Maybe I misunderstood the utility-correction idea, but it seemed to me it was about individual human lives, not acts by agents who might create lives. There is the act of reproduction, but there is (at the time of decision) no such thing as the child.
But there is an expected personal utility for the potential being created.
Sure, but if you interpret your principle that way, I think it loses some plausibility in the original context of average vs total utilitarianism (etc.). When B is a variable ranging over different people, it’s no longer so plausible that we should be indifferent when the expected personal utility for B is zero.