Computer game characters also exhibit ”intentions” and such, but there’s nobody home a lot of the time, unless you’re playing against another person.
Yes, but what we know about the structure of a computer program is greatly different than what we know about the structure of an animal brain. More complex brains seem to share a lot of our own architecture, mammals brains are ridiculously complex, and mammals show a lot of behaviours that isn’t purely directed to acquiring food, reproducing and running from predators.
For animals such as frogs and bugs, which seem to be built more like a “sensory input goes in, reflex goes out” I’d accept more doubt on whether the “somebody’s home” metaphor can be considered true, for mammals and other smarter animals the doubt are a lot less believable.
It seems cows might be smarter than dogs and highly intelligent, and right now dogs are discussed as possibly having self-recognition, since they pass olfactory tests that require self recognition (from what I saw it seems the tests are a bit more complex than just requiring the dog to have a “this-is-your-urine-mark-for-your-territory.exe” in its brain).
Generally speaking, cows show to have long term social relations with each others, good problem solving skills, and long term effects on their emotional range from negative experiences. I haven’t been able to find information on cows passing or failing self-recognition tests, visual or not, but from the intelligence they show I’d put them pretty high on moral meaningfulness.
Pigs are notoriously smart and have passed the self-recognition test, as Pattern commented.
Though, I think my main point it’s that even simpler animals, as long as the brain architecture allows for doubts that our experience of “being home”, feeling pain and etc, is in some way generalisable to theirs, would have some scaled down moral weight.
If I had to lose my higher cognitive function and be reduced to animal levels of intelligence, I wouldn’t really be okay with agreeing to be subjected to significative pain in exchange for a trivial benefit now, on the ground that I wouldn’t be sapient.
Note: this isn’t really aimed at turning lesswrongers vegan. There are convincing reasons to be vegan based on the impact over humans, but if you are already trying to be an effective altruist by doing a hard job I can accept the need of conserving willpower and efficiency, though I guess one could consider if he/she/they could reduce consumption without risks.
I think the issue of the moral weight of animals should be considered independently from the consequences it might hold for one’s diet or behaviour, or we’re just back to plain rationalisation.
Yes, but what we know about the structure of a computer program is greatly different than what we know about the structure of an animal brain. More complex brains seem to share a lot of our own architecture, mammals brains are ridiculously complex, and mammals show a lot of behaviours that isn’t purely directed to acquiring food, reproducing and running from predators.
For animals such as frogs and bugs, which seem to be built more like a “sensory input goes in, reflex goes out” I’d accept more doubt on whether the “somebody’s home” metaphor can be considered true, for mammals and other smarter animals the doubt are a lot less believable.
It seems cows might be smarter than dogs and highly intelligent, and right now dogs are discussed as possibly having self-recognition, since they pass olfactory tests that require self recognition (from what I saw it seems the tests are a bit more complex than just requiring the dog to have a “this-is-your-urine-mark-for-your-territory.exe” in its brain).
Generally speaking, cows show to have long term social relations with each others, good problem solving skills, and long term effects on their emotional range from negative experiences. I haven’t been able to find information on cows passing or failing self-recognition tests, visual or not, but from the intelligence they show I’d put them pretty high on moral meaningfulness.
Pigs are notoriously smart and have passed the self-recognition test, as Pattern commented.
Though, I think my main point it’s that even simpler animals, as long as the brain architecture allows for doubts that our experience of “being home”, feeling pain and etc, is in some way generalisable to theirs, would have some scaled down moral weight.
If I had to lose my higher cognitive function and be reduced to animal levels of intelligence, I wouldn’t really be okay with agreeing to be subjected to significative pain in exchange for a trivial benefit now, on the ground that I wouldn’t be sapient.
Note: this isn’t really aimed at turning lesswrongers vegan. There are convincing reasons to be vegan based on the impact over humans, but if you are already trying to be an effective altruist by doing a hard job I can accept the need of conserving willpower and efficiency, though I guess one could consider if he/she/they could reduce consumption without risks.
I think the issue of the moral weight of animals should be considered independently from the consequences it might hold for one’s diet or behaviour, or we’re just back to plain rationalisation.