if i’m understanding right: - alief: you intuitively feel this to be true, but are not intellectually convinced that it is true. you may behave as if it is true but don’t necessarily endorse that behavior - belief: you may or may not intuitively feel this to be true, but you are intellectually convinced that it is true. you generally behave as if it is true and endorse doing so - celief: you do not intuitively feel this to be true, nor are you intellectually convinced that it is true, but you behave as if it is true regardless for pragmatic reasons (though you may not necessarily endorse this)
Alief—I don’t really “believe X in my head” but act as if I believed X.
Anti-alief—I really “believe X in my head” but don’t act as if I believed X. (That’s at least one way of reversing it.) (Although this could also be seen as “alieving not-X”.)
Celief (AFAIU) - I have good reasons to have high credence in X but can’t see the gears/am not sufficiently capable of assessing the claims on my own, so I have a substantial model uncertainty. This may be accompanied by different degrees of “acting as if believing X/not-X (with some probability)”.
I guess with action, you feel obligated to act as if X is true, but you’re not understanding why. It’s like being blindfolded and told to walk in some direction and “trusting” that it’ll all work out.
So an anti-alief (as you described) would be like you intellectually believe that junk food is bad for you, but can’t really bring yourself to stop eating it or feel any fear for your healthy when you do. Whereas a celief would be if you don’t even intellectually believe that junk food is bad for you, but you try to avoid it anyways because everyone says it’s bad for you (esp. people whose opinions you usually respect), and so what are the chances they’re all wrong vs the chances you just don’t understand it yet?
Is a “celief” in something meaningfully different from an “alief” in its opposite?
if i’m understanding right:
- alief: you intuitively feel this to be true, but are not intellectually convinced that it is true. you may behave as if it is true but don’t necessarily endorse that behavior
- belief: you may or may not intuitively feel this to be true, but you are intellectually convinced that it is true. you generally behave as if it is true and endorse doing so
- celief: you do not intuitively feel this to be true, nor are you intellectually convinced that it is true, but you behave as if it is true regardless for pragmatic reasons (though you may not necessarily endorse this)
Alief—I don’t really “believe X in my head” but act as if I believed X.
Anti-alief—I really “believe X in my head” but don’t act as if I believed X. (That’s at least one way of reversing it.) (Although this could also be seen as “alieving not-X”.)
Celief (AFAIU) - I have good reasons to have high credence in X but can’t see the gears/am not sufficiently capable of assessing the claims on my own, so I have a substantial model uncertainty. This may be accompanied by different degrees of “acting as if believing X/not-X (with some probability)”.
This definition seems so vague and broad as to be unusuable.
I guess with action, you feel obligated to act as if X is true, but you’re not understanding why. It’s like being blindfolded and told to walk in some direction and “trusting” that it’ll all work out.
So an anti-alief (as you described) would be like you intellectually believe that junk food is bad for you, but can’t really bring yourself to stop eating it or feel any fear for your healthy when you do. Whereas a celief would be if you don’t even intellectually believe that junk food is bad for you, but you try to avoid it anyways because everyone says it’s bad for you (esp. people whose opinions you usually respect), and so what are the chances they’re all wrong vs the chances you just don’t understand it yet?