The point is that without arbitrarily drawing the specks/torture boundary somewhere between x stabbed toes and x+epsilon stabbed toes the suggested utility function does not work.
Hm, how can I help you see why I don’t think this is a problem?
How about this. The following two sentences contain exactly the same content to me:
“Without arbitrarily drawing the specks/torture boundary somewhere, the suggested utility function does not work.”
“Without drawing the specks/torture boundary somewhere, the suggested utility function does not work.”
Why? Because morality is already arbitrary. Every element is arbitrary. The question is not “can we tolerate an arbitrary boundary,” but “should this boundary be here or not?”
Are you saying that you are OK with having x stabbed toes being incommensurate with torture, but x+1 being commensurate ? This would be a very peculiar utility function.
Yes, that is what I am saying. One can deduce from this that I don’t find it so peculiar.
To be clear, this doesn’t reflect at all what goes on in my personal decision-making process, since I’m human. However, I don’t find it any stranger than, say, having torture be arbitrarily 3^3^2 times worse than a dust speck, rather than 3^3^2 + 5.
Sarcasm time: I mean, seriously—are you honestly saying that at 3^3^2 + 1 dust specks, it’s worse than torture, but at 3^3^2 − 1, it’s better? That’s so… arbitrary. What’s so special about those two dust specks? That would be so… peculiar.
As soon as you allow the arbitrary size of a number to be “peculiar,” there is no longer any such thing as a non-peculiar set of preferences. That’s just how consistent preferences work. Discounting sets of preferences on account of “strangeness and arbitrariness” isn’t worth the effort, really.
The point is that without arbitrarily drawing the specks/torture boundary somewhere between x stabbed toes and x+epsilon stabbed toes the suggested utility function does not work.
Hm, how can I help you see why I don’t think this is a problem?
How about this. The following two sentences contain exactly the same content to me:
“Without arbitrarily drawing the specks/torture boundary somewhere, the suggested utility function does not work.”
“Without drawing the specks/torture boundary somewhere, the suggested utility function does not work.”
Why? Because morality is already arbitrary. Every element is arbitrary. The question is not “can we tolerate an arbitrary boundary,” but “should this boundary be here or not?”
Are you saying that you are OK with having x stabbed toes being incommensurate with torture, but x+1 being commensurate ? This would be a very peculiar utility function.
Yes, that is what I am saying. One can deduce from this that I don’t find it so peculiar.
To be clear, this doesn’t reflect at all what goes on in my personal decision-making process, since I’m human. However, I don’t find it any stranger than, say, having torture be arbitrarily 3^3^2 times worse than a dust speck, rather than 3^3^2 + 5.
Sarcasm time: I mean, seriously—are you honestly saying that at 3^3^2 + 1 dust specks, it’s worse than torture, but at 3^3^2 − 1, it’s better? That’s so… arbitrary. What’s so special about those two dust specks? That would be so… peculiar.
As soon as you allow the arbitrary size of a number to be “peculiar,” there is no longer any such thing as a non-peculiar set of preferences. That’s just how consistent preferences work. Discounting sets of preferences on account of “strangeness and arbitrariness” isn’t worth the effort, really.
I don’t mean peculiar in any negative sense, just that it would not be suitable for goal optimization.
Is that really what you meant? Huh.
Could you elaborate?