Some additional thoughts on this (don’t feel that you need to respond if you don’t want to):
It has been said (and we generally take it to be true) that if you say “I’ll try to do X”, then what you really mean is that you’re going to try to try to do X; you might not, in the end, actually try to do X.
It has also been said (and we generally take it to be true) that if you say “I believe X”, or “I believe in X”, then what you’re expressing isn’t a belief in X, but rather a belief that you believe X. Perhaps you actually believe X; perhaps not.
The pattern here is similar to (though not identical with) those patterns. The following two statements are, in fact, expressing different things:
This doesn’t work well.
I don’t think this works well.
Likewise, these two statements are expressing different things:
X is better than Y.
I prefer X to Y.
And, again, these two statements are expressing different things:
X is terrible.
X is sub-optimal.
Consider a norm that you should never make object-level claims; you must only state explicitly that you believe so-and-so. What effect does this have, on our ability to discern and discuss the above distinctions?
Some additional thoughts on this (don’t feel that you need to respond if you don’t want to):
It has been said (and we generally take it to be true) that if you say “I’ll try to do X”, then what you really mean is that you’re going to try to try to do X; you might not, in the end, actually try to do X.
It has also been said (and we generally take it to be true) that if you say “I believe X”, or “I believe in X”, then what you’re expressing isn’t a belief in X, but rather a belief that you believe X. Perhaps you actually believe X; perhaps not.
The pattern here is similar to (though not identical with) those patterns. The following two statements are, in fact, expressing different things:
This doesn’t work well.
I don’t think this works well.
Likewise, these two statements are expressing different things:
X is better than Y.
I prefer X to Y.
And, again, these two statements are expressing different things:
X is terrible.
X is sub-optimal.
Consider a norm that you should never make object-level claims; you must only state explicitly that you believe so-and-so. What effect does this have, on our ability to discern and discuss the above distinctions?