Suppose that you are a woman’s genes. You have a choice between two men. One is just an ordinary, eligible guy. The other has made a solemn lifelong commitment to give 50% of his wealth away to random strangers. Which sperm would you like to fertilize your egg with? Think about the kind of sons and grandsons that would be the result.
Such a commitment is a form of signalling, like a peacock’s tail. Someone who manages to keep that commitment can afford to do so, signaling wealth.
Sure, but you can also achieve the same signalling-of-wealth value by using 50% of your wealth to buy Ferraris, Gold watches and designer suits.
Is there any relevant difference between signalling wealth by charitable donation versus conspicuous consumption? I think so: from the female genes’ point of view, conspicuous consumption signals selfishness, the desire to look after your own, whereas the charity signals sucker-ness—the desire to help others who are not reciprocating.
This is the altruist’s burden: if you help society at large, you create the counterpoint public choice problem to the special interests problem in politics. You harm a concentrated interest (friends, partner, children) in order to reward a diffuse interest (helping each of billions of people infinitesimally).
The concentrated interest then retaliates, because by standard public choice theory it has an incentive to do so, but the diffuse interest just ignores you.
I think so: from the female genes’ point of view, conspicuous consumption signals selfishness, the desire to look after your own, whereas the charity signals sucker-ness—the desire to help others who are not reciprocating.
It’s much more complicated than that. By improper conspicuous consumption, you can easily end up signaling that you’re a sucker. Even worse, you’ll signal that you’re the sort of sucker who’s easy to separate from his money. You can probably imagine the possible consequences of that botched signal.
Generally speaking, effective conspicuous consumption is very difficult to pull off. This of course doesn’t apply to the level of conspicuous consumption that you’re expected to undertake to avoid coming off as a weirdo given your position in society, but anything beyond that is dangerously apt to backfire in a multitude of ways.
Regarding counter-signaling, I remember the “Too Cool for School” paper that was linked from Marginal Revolution a few years ago, along with the subsequent “False Modesty” paper that shares a co-author. These seem to be the standard references about the topic.
But more importantly, I don’t think academic insight in this area gathered so far is particularly worthwhile. Before getting into complex mathematical models can be really fruitful, we first need an informal common-sense overview of the situation, in order to know where to look for situations that provide suitable material for more solid theories. Unfortunately, in this regard, even the most insightful people have made only baby steps so far.
Such a commitment is a form of signalling, like a peacock’s tail. Someone who manages to keep that commitment can afford to do so, signaling wealth.
Sure, but you can also achieve the same signalling-of-wealth value by using 50% of your wealth to buy Ferraris, Gold watches and designer suits.
Is there any relevant difference between signalling wealth by charitable donation versus conspicuous consumption? I think so: from the female genes’ point of view, conspicuous consumption signals selfishness, the desire to look after your own, whereas the charity signals sucker-ness—the desire to help others who are not reciprocating.
This is the altruist’s burden: if you help society at large, you create the counterpoint public choice problem to the special interests problem in politics. You harm a concentrated interest (friends, partner, children) in order to reward a diffuse interest (helping each of billions of people infinitesimally).
The concentrated interest then retaliates, because by standard public choice theory it has an incentive to do so, but the diffuse interest just ignores you.
Roko:
It’s much more complicated than that. By improper conspicuous consumption, you can easily end up signaling that you’re a sucker. Even worse, you’ll signal that you’re the sort of sucker who’s easy to separate from his money. You can probably imagine the possible consequences of that botched signal.
Generally speaking, effective conspicuous consumption is very difficult to pull off. This of course doesn’t apply to the level of conspicuous consumption that you’re expected to undertake to avoid coming off as a weirdo given your position in society, but anything beyond that is dangerously apt to backfire in a multitude of ways.
This seems like a nitpick: it is orthogonal to the point at issue.
I was’t attacking the point at issue. It just seemed worth pointing out as a digression.
Sure. Actually, I’d be interested if you had any academic references on the details of signalling theory, especially issues like counter-signalling
Regarding counter-signaling, I remember the “Too Cool for School” paper that was linked from Marginal Revolution a few years ago, along with the subsequent “False Modesty” paper that shares a co-author. These seem to be the standard references about the topic.
But more importantly, I don’t think academic insight in this area gathered so far is particularly worthwhile. Before getting into complex mathematical models can be really fruitful, we first need an informal common-sense overview of the situation, in order to know where to look for situations that provide suitable material for more solid theories. Unfortunately, in this regard, even the most insightful people have made only baby steps so far.