By agential, I mean that the ontology I am using is from the point of view of an agent: a perspective that can, at the very least, receive observations, have cognitions, and take actions. By critical, I mean that this ontology involves uncertain conjectures subject to criticism, such as criticism of being logically incoherent or incompatible with observations. This is very much in a similar spirit to critical rationalism.
Critical rationalism is an awkward bedfellow to relativism. Central examples of criticisms tend to involve contradiction, but relativists can reject contradictions on the basis that A is indexed to X but Not-A is indexed to Y.
Let R be a relation. Then “R(X, Y)” contradicts “not R(X, Y)”. Of course people can misuse language to be tricky about this.
Special relativity is falsifiable even though it defines position/velocity relationally.
Falsifiability, properly understood, is subjective, in that the falsifier must be some cognitive process that can make observations. Experimental results can only falsify theories if those results are observed by some cognitive process that can conceptualize the theory. Unobservable experimental results are of no use.
(Yes, the cognitive process may be a standardized intersubjective, if the observations and theories are common knowledge; Popper emphasizes this intersubjectivity in The Logic of Scientific Discovery. However, if Robinson Crusoe is theoretically capable of science, this intersubjectivity is not strictly necessary)
Let R be a relation. Then “R(X, Y)” contradicts “not R(X, Y)”.
But the relativist can just go to R(X,YZ). It’s a general counterargument.
Special relativity is falsifiable even though it defines position/velocity relationally.
As discussed, relativity isn’t relativism.
...the falsifier must be some cognitive process that can make observations. Experimental results can only falsify theories if those results are observed by some cognitive process that can conceptualize the theory. Unobservable experimental results are of no use.
None of that ^^^ supports this VVV …
Falsifiability, properly understood, is subjective,[...]
...because “subjective” doesn’t mean “done by some kind of agent”.
Yes, the cognitive process may be a standardized intersubjective[...]
Critical rationalism is an awkward bedfellow to relativism. Central examples of criticisms tend to involve contradiction, but relativists can reject contradictions on the basis that A is indexed to X but Not-A is indexed to Y.
Let R be a relation. Then “R(X, Y)” contradicts “not R(X, Y)”. Of course people can misuse language to be tricky about this.
Special relativity is falsifiable even though it defines position/velocity relationally.
Falsifiability, properly understood, is subjective, in that the falsifier must be some cognitive process that can make observations. Experimental results can only falsify theories if those results are observed by some cognitive process that can conceptualize the theory. Unobservable experimental results are of no use.
(Yes, the cognitive process may be a standardized intersubjective, if the observations and theories are common knowledge; Popper emphasizes this intersubjectivity in The Logic of Scientific Discovery. However, if Robinson Crusoe is theoretically capable of science, this intersubjectivity is not strictly necessary)
But the relativist can just go to R(X,YZ). It’s a general counterargument.
As discussed, relativity isn’t relativism.
None of that ^^^ supports this VVV …
...because “subjective” doesn’t mean “done by some kind of agent”.
Indeed.