One criterion for a procedure to be objective is that it can be carried out equally by anyone.
A procedure which includes a codicil: “Sometimes, I will step in and overturn the arrangement”. Fails on three counts:
1 It fails to explicitly define the criteria for making interventions.
2 Nothing is said about the range of interventions that will be entertained.
3 It does not specify the means by which the type of intervention will be determined.
The name for this is dictat, and is almost always inappropriate and dangerous.
There are other ways of building in flexibility. For instance:
In cases many where the environment (causes) is very unpredictable, it is still possible to establish guidelines with reference to effects.
At the same time, the “rule” can explicitly state criteria for turning off the intervention, thereby reducing the risk that the intervention become a new normal.
Types of interventions can also be limited to a pre-existing list of alternatives, which can be criticised and vetted before the emergency is triggered.
There are other ways of building in flexibility. For instance:
In cases many where the environment (causes) is very unpredictable, it is still possible to establish guidelines with reference to effects.
At the same time, the “rule” can explicitly state criteria for turning off the intervention, thereby reducing the risk that the intervention become a new normal.
Types of interventions can also be limited to a pre-existing list of alternatives, which can be criticised and vetted before the emergency is triggered.
Yes, all of these things can be done. And if you do any or all of them, and do not have a provision for applying judgment that stands above any of these provisions, your system will be exploitable. This is nostalgebraist’s point.
In practice, there will always exist “no, actually, we’re not following that rule in this case” exceptions. Our options are as follows:
Pretend strenuously that no exceptions exist. Apply the rules as inflexibly as possible, even (in fact, especially) in cases where it really seems like we shouldn’t apply them, to maintain the illusion that no exceptions exist.
Admit the fact that exceptions exist; attempt to make explicit, clarify, and rationalize the criteria for exception-making (in other words, fold them into the explicit rules); nevertheless maintain the option to exercise judgment, in contravention to the rules.
Crucially, in case #1, there will still be exceptions. They will be “snuck in” via creative interpretation of the rules, or via expansion or alteration of the rule set with rules that are bad rules (and exist only to allow a certain class of cases which the rules would otherwise forbid), or via manipulations outside the rule system that make the rule-based decision itself irrelevant, or in any number of other ways. Look to our criminal justice system for examples, and our political system also; and any number of other systems of rules.
Note three things:
First, that nostalgebraist’s advice does not in any way prevent you from formulating guidelines, and attempting to minimize and to circumscribe the scope of your “extralegal” judgments. In fact, you should do this—especially if you find yourself making such “extralegal” exceptions often! You should seek a pattern in them, and see if they (or at least some of them) can be made into a rule; or, perhaps, if the existing rules need to be altered.
Second, the “fail-safe” clause is not meant to be used only by one “side” or party in some relationship—quite the opposite! Consider what nostalgebraist says:
Of course, this option can itself be abused, particularly if it is used freely and unthinkingly. If the rules hold only until the moment you don’t like their consequences, then the rules don’t really hold at all.
But if someone does that, you can take the same option yourself: “yeah, I said you should have this option, but using it like that is wrong.” Because the option does not have specific rules (by construction), no one can use rules lawyering to take it away from you. If someone uses “calling bullshit” for bad ends, you can just call bullshit on them.
If someone is using “sometimes I will just use my judgment” to be a capricious, unpredictable dictator, then you say: “you are acting improperly”. By construction, it will do the would-be tyrant no good to say “ah, but we agreed that I can use my judgment whenever I see fit, so your objection is invalid”!
Third, you say:
In the realm of psychology and politics, rules gain legitimacy when they are adhered to over a long period of time and when they are seen to consistently protect against bad outcomes.
There is a case for flexible interpretation, but an agent who abandons rules too frequently, and with slight incentive will eventually lose confidence in his ability to abide by rules.
Here you are speaking first about legitimacy—how rules meant to bind others are perceived by the public—and then, apparently, about self-control and will. These are not the same thing, and it does no good to discuss them both in the same breath.
What is an “objective procedure”? How does it differ from a procedure which is not “objective”?
One criterion for a procedure to be objective is that it can be carried out equally by anyone.
A procedure which includes a codicil: “Sometimes, I will step in and overturn the arrangement”. Fails on three counts:
1 It fails to explicitly define the criteria for making interventions.
2 Nothing is said about the range of interventions that will be entertained.
3 It does not specify the means by which the type of intervention will be determined.
The name for this is dictat, and is almost always inappropriate and dangerous.
There are other ways of building in flexibility. For instance:
In cases many where the environment (causes) is very unpredictable, it is still possible to establish guidelines with reference to effects.
At the same time, the “rule” can explicitly state criteria for turning off the intervention, thereby reducing the risk that the intervention become a new normal.
Types of interventions can also be limited to a pre-existing list of alternatives, which can be criticised and vetted before the emergency is triggered.
Yes, all of these things can be done. And if you do any or all of them, and do not have a provision for applying judgment that stands above any of these provisions, your system will be exploitable. This is nostalgebraist’s point.
In practice, there will always exist “no, actually, we’re not following that rule in this case” exceptions. Our options are as follows:
Pretend strenuously that no exceptions exist. Apply the rules as inflexibly as possible, even (in fact, especially) in cases where it really seems like we shouldn’t apply them, to maintain the illusion that no exceptions exist.
Admit the fact that exceptions exist; attempt to make explicit, clarify, and rationalize the criteria for exception-making (in other words, fold them into the explicit rules); nevertheless maintain the option to exercise judgment, in contravention to the rules.
Crucially, in case #1, there will still be exceptions. They will be “snuck in” via creative interpretation of the rules, or via expansion or alteration of the rule set with rules that are bad rules (and exist only to allow a certain class of cases which the rules would otherwise forbid), or via manipulations outside the rule system that make the rule-based decision itself irrelevant, or in any number of other ways. Look to our criminal justice system for examples, and our political system also; and any number of other systems of rules.
Note three things:
First, that nostalgebraist’s advice does not in any way prevent you from formulating guidelines, and attempting to minimize and to circumscribe the scope of your “extralegal” judgments. In fact, you should do this—especially if you find yourself making such “extralegal” exceptions often! You should seek a pattern in them, and see if they (or at least some of them) can be made into a rule; or, perhaps, if the existing rules need to be altered.
Second, the “fail-safe” clause is not meant to be used only by one “side” or party in some relationship—quite the opposite! Consider what nostalgebraist says:
If someone is using “sometimes I will just use my judgment” to be a capricious, unpredictable dictator, then you say: “you are acting improperly”. By construction, it will do the would-be tyrant no good to say “ah, but we agreed that I can use my judgment whenever I see fit, so your objection is invalid”!
Third, you say:
Here you are speaking first about legitimacy—how rules meant to bind others are perceived by the public—and then, apparently, about self-control and will. These are not the same thing, and it does no good to discuss them both in the same breath.