This seems like a very narrow view of shame and guilt to me.
The cognitive processes responsible for the intention to conceal what we call shame are necessarily partitioned from the ones that handle our public, pronormative personas. If someone senses enough optimization for moral concealment in their self and those around them
What about things we conceal, less because of what other people think of those behaviors but because they are inconsistent with how we see ourselves or the standards we like to hold ourselves to?
For example, a singer songwriter was up last last night, had a few drinks, they play a show the next morning which goes great. It’s a hit. Everyone loves them, everyone in the audience is convinced the singer-songwriter played great. But backstage after the show “I shouldn’t have stayed up late, I could have played so much better, this was such an average show. It should have been a great show. I was holding back, I could have sung so much better.”
What does that come under? They certainly feel ashamed, they feel guilt over what they perceive to be the cause of their only-average playing. But this is in spite suffering no social consequences and indeed exceeding the expectations of proper behavior of everyone around them.
They expect that they can call on allies to derail investigations of their bad behavior, on the fly, by instantaneous mutual recognition.
Except frequently I think people who are ashamed don’t expect this. Imagine that instead of concealing they openly admit and apologize for being only average: then what? Aren’t they still ashamed?
Admitting and apologizing for being ‘only average’ often functions as a submission move in dominance hierarchies, i.e. pecking orders.
This move derails attempts to enact more naïve, descriptive-language accountability. When someone has a specific grievance, it corresponds to a claim about the relation between facts and commitments that can be evaluated as true or false. Responding with self-deprecation transforms their concrete complaint into a mere opportunity to either accept or reject the display of submission. This disrupts the sort of language in which object-level accounting can happen, since the original specific issues are neither addressed nor refuted. Rather, they are displaced by the lower-dimensional social dynamics of dominance and submission.
So viewed systemically, such moves are part of a distributed strategy by which pecking orders disrupt and displace descriptive language communities by coordinating to invalidate them. And viewed locally, they erase the specific grievance from common knowledge, preserving the motivating shame.
I don’t think you understand, in the example I gave they don’t think they are ‘average’ they think their performance was not to the standard they hold themselves, and they believe that this was precipitated by their drinking which they regret. He is talking PAST the person after the show, not to them, almost like a soliloquy.
Do you think that every time you’ve ever felt shame it has always been primarily because of what others may think of you? You have never ever felt a solipsistic shame, a shame even though no one will know, no one will care, it has no negative influence on anyone other than yourself, and the only person you have to answer to is you? Never?
Except frequently I think people who are ashamed don’t expect this. Imagine that instead of concealing they openly admit and apologize for being only average: then what? Aren’t they still ashamed?
Different example—I said “instead”—so if the musician openly admits and apologize for only being average they are ashamed because they are afraid of the reaction of the fan who clearly loved their performance (not their failure to abstain from what they believe is the cause of their average performance?), but if they don’t mention it to anyone (therefore are committing neither a dominance nor submission gesture) they are also ashamed? Or are they not ashamed in both circumstances? I’m just saying I’m really confused.
Are you telling me there is no conceivable circumstance where any human being feels shame for something which is totally alone, none at all? Because at the risk of assuming I have privileged knowledge of myself—I assure you I’ve felt shame for things which no one would care about.
If you look back, you’ll see I was specifically responding to the hypothetical scenario about public admission in that comment. For your points about private shame, you might want to check my other comment replying to you where I addressed how internal shame and self-image maintenance connect to social dynamics.
I notice you’re attributing positions to me that I haven’t taken and expressing confusion about points I’ve already addressed in detail. It would be helpful if you could engage more carefully with what I’ve carefully written.
so if the musician openly admits and apologize for only being average they are ashamed because they are afraid of the reaction of the fan who clearly loved their performance (not their failure to abstain from what they believe is the cause of their average performance?)
You’re introducing new elements that weren’t in your original scenario. But more importantly: you described the show as “a hit” where “everyone loves them.” Calling this performance “only average” isn’t accurately revealing adverse information—it’s a lie.
but if they don’t mention it to anyone (therefore are committing neither a dominance nor submission gesture) they are also ashamed?
In my other reply to you, I explained how private shame often involves maintaining conflicting mental models—one that enables confident performance and another that tracks specific flaws for improvement. Even when no one would directly know or care about staying up late drinking, the performer may feel shame because they’ve invested in an identity as a “professional musician” or “disciplined performer”—an identity that others care about and grant certain privileges to. The shame comes from violating the requirements of this identity, which serves as a proxy for social approval and professional opportunities. This creates internal pressure toward shame even without a specific idea of someone else who would directly condemn the behavior or trait in question.
Are you telling me there is no conceivable circumstance where any human being feels shame for something which is totally alone, none at all?
What I’m suggesting is that shame inherently involves at least a tacit social component—some imagined perspective by which we are condemned. This is consistent with Smith’s and Hume’s moral sentiments theory, where moral judgments fundamentally involve taking up imagined perspectives of others. This doesn’t mean the shame isn’t genuinely felt or that any specific others would actually condemn us. But in my experience people can frequently unravel particular cases of such shame by honestly examining what specific others would actually think if they knew, which is some experimental validation for this view.
We conceal some facts about ourselves from ourselves to maintain a self-image because such self-images affect how we present ourselves to others and thus what we can be socially entitled to. This is similar to what psychologist Carol Dweck called a “fixed mindset,” in contrast with a “growth mindset” where the self-image more explicitly includes the possibility of intentional improvement.
In the singer-songwriter example, creating a good vibe with the audience generally involves projecting confidence. This confidence can connect to an identity as a competent performer, which maintains entitlement to the audience’s approval as well as other perks like booking future shows and charging higher rates. We might think of the performer as implicitly reasoning, “I must have audience approval in order to maintain my identity. I get audience approval by being a good performer. Therefore I must be a good performer. Good performers perform flawlessly. Therefore I must have performed flawlessly. Staying out late would cause flaws in my performance. Therefore I must not have stayed out late.”
Meanwhile, improving as a performer requires honestly evaluating weaknesses in one’s performance—noticing timing issues, pitch problems, or moments where energy flagged. This evaluation process works best with immediate, specific feedback while memories are fresh. Or, in the specific example you gave, the performer’s process of improvement needs to include the specific factual memory that they stayed out late, which likely impaired their performance.
When the good vibe with the audience is based on a rigidly maintained self-image, this creates an internal conflict: The same performance needs to be confidently good for maintaining entitlement and specifically flawed to enable improvement. This conflict creates pressure toward shame—the performer must maintain a persona that cannot acknowledge certain facts, while those facts are still actively used to make decisions.
This seems like a very narrow view of shame and guilt to me.
What about things we conceal, less because of what other people think of those behaviors but because they are inconsistent with how we see ourselves or the standards we like to hold ourselves to?
For example, a singer songwriter was up last last night, had a few drinks, they play a show the next morning which goes great. It’s a hit. Everyone loves them, everyone in the audience is convinced the singer-songwriter played great. But backstage after the show “I shouldn’t have stayed up late, I could have played so much better, this was such an average show. It should have been a great show. I was holding back, I could have sung so much better.”
What does that come under? They certainly feel ashamed, they feel guilt over what they perceive to be the cause of their only-average playing. But this is in spite suffering no social consequences and indeed exceeding the expectations of proper behavior of everyone around them.
Except frequently I think people who are ashamed don’t expect this. Imagine that instead of concealing they openly admit and apologize for being only average: then what? Aren’t they still ashamed?
That’s why I distinguished explicitly between shame and depravity in the OP.
Admitting and apologizing for being ‘only average’ often functions as a submission move in dominance hierarchies, i.e. pecking orders.
This move derails attempts to enact more naïve, descriptive-language accountability. When someone has a specific grievance, it corresponds to a claim about the relation between facts and commitments that can be evaluated as true or false. Responding with self-deprecation transforms their concrete complaint into a mere opportunity to either accept or reject the display of submission. This disrupts the sort of language in which object-level accounting can happen, since the original specific issues are neither addressed nor refuted. Rather, they are displaced by the lower-dimensional social dynamics of dominance and submission.
So viewed systemically, such moves are part of a distributed strategy by which pecking orders disrupt and displace descriptive language communities by coordinating to invalidate them. And viewed locally, they erase the specific grievance from common knowledge, preserving the motivating shame.
I don’t think you understand, in the example I gave they don’t think they are ‘average’ they think their performance was not to the standard they hold themselves, and they believe that this was precipitated by their drinking which they regret. He is talking PAST the person after the show, not to them, almost like a soliloquy.
Do you think that every time you’ve ever felt shame it has always been primarily because of what others may think of you? You have never ever felt a solipsistic shame, a shame even though no one will know, no one will care, it has no negative influence on anyone other than yourself, and the only person you have to answer to is you? Never?
In this example?
Different example—I said “instead”—so if the musician openly admits and apologize for only being average they are ashamed because they are afraid of the reaction of the fan who clearly loved their performance (not their failure to abstain from what they believe is the cause of their average performance?), but if they don’t mention it to anyone (therefore are committing neither a dominance nor submission gesture) they are also ashamed? Or are they not ashamed in both circumstances? I’m just saying I’m really confused.
Are you telling me there is no conceivable circumstance where any human being feels shame for something which is totally alone, none at all? Because at the risk of assuming I have privileged knowledge of myself—I assure you I’ve felt shame for things which no one would care about.
If you look back, you’ll see I was specifically responding to the hypothetical scenario about public admission in that comment. For your points about private shame, you might want to check my other comment replying to you where I addressed how internal shame and self-image maintenance connect to social dynamics.
I notice you’re attributing positions to me that I haven’t taken and expressing confusion about points I’ve already addressed in detail. It would be helpful if you could engage more carefully with what I’ve carefully written.
You’re introducing new elements that weren’t in your original scenario. But more importantly: you described the show as “a hit” where “everyone loves them.” Calling this performance “only average” isn’t accurately revealing adverse information—it’s a lie.
In my other reply to you, I explained how private shame often involves maintaining conflicting mental models—one that enables confident performance and another that tracks specific flaws for improvement. Even when no one would directly know or care about staying up late drinking, the performer may feel shame because they’ve invested in an identity as a “professional musician” or “disciplined performer”—an identity that others care about and grant certain privileges to. The shame comes from violating the requirements of this identity, which serves as a proxy for social approval and professional opportunities. This creates internal pressure toward shame even without a specific idea of someone else who would directly condemn the behavior or trait in question.
What I’m suggesting is that shame inherently involves at least a tacit social component—some imagined perspective by which we are condemned. This is consistent with Smith’s and Hume’s moral sentiments theory, where moral judgments fundamentally involve taking up imagined perspectives of others. This doesn’t mean the shame isn’t genuinely felt or that any specific others would actually condemn us. But in my experience people can frequently unravel particular cases of such shame by honestly examining what specific others would actually think if they knew, which is some experimental validation for this view.
We conceal some facts about ourselves from ourselves to maintain a self-image because such self-images affect how we present ourselves to others and thus what we can be socially entitled to. This is similar to what psychologist Carol Dweck called a “fixed mindset,” in contrast with a “growth mindset” where the self-image more explicitly includes the possibility of intentional improvement.
In the singer-songwriter example, creating a good vibe with the audience generally involves projecting confidence. This confidence can connect to an identity as a competent performer, which maintains entitlement to the audience’s approval as well as other perks like booking future shows and charging higher rates. We might think of the performer as implicitly reasoning, “I must have audience approval in order to maintain my identity. I get audience approval by being a good performer. Therefore I must be a good performer. Good performers perform flawlessly. Therefore I must have performed flawlessly. Staying out late would cause flaws in my performance. Therefore I must not have stayed out late.”
Meanwhile, improving as a performer requires honestly evaluating weaknesses in one’s performance—noticing timing issues, pitch problems, or moments where energy flagged. This evaluation process works best with immediate, specific feedback while memories are fresh. Or, in the specific example you gave, the performer’s process of improvement needs to include the specific factual memory that they stayed out late, which likely impaired their performance.
When the good vibe with the audience is based on a rigidly maintained self-image, this creates an internal conflict: The same performance needs to be confidently good for maintaining entitlement and specifically flawed to enable improvement. This conflict creates pressure toward shame—the performer must maintain a persona that cannot acknowledge certain facts, while those facts are still actively used to make decisions.
Some other prior work on this topic:
Robin Hanson:
A Theory of Identity
Paul Christiano:
If we can’t lie to others, we will lie to ourselves
Epistemic incentives and sluggish updating