“There is an assumption here that your future self shares an identity with your current self that other people don’t, which is called Closed Individualism.”
I actually wrote the argument for people who believe in Closed Individualism. I myself subscribe to Open Individualism. The purpose was to convince people who subscribe to Closed Individualism to not reject cryonics on the basis that their identity will be lost. Some people, even if revived after cryonics, may worry that their identity has fundamentally changed which can lead to an existential crisis.
“I’m not saying that Open Individualism is definitely true, but Closed Individualism is almost certainly not true, and that’s enough to be disinterested in cryonics.”
Why would believing Open Individualism to be true cause disinterest in cryonics? I would be ecstatic to continue working on what I love after my natural lifespan has ended. A few centuries of life experience could give so much depth to art that cannot be gained through only 80 years.
That’s interesting, both because I wouldn’t expect an Open Individualist to be interested in cryonics, and because I wouldn’t expect an OI to make this argument. Do you agree that you could prove much stronger claims about identity with equal validity?
It feels strange to me, somewhat analogous to arguing that Bigfoot can’t do magic while neglecting to mention that he also doesn’t exist. But I’m not saying that arguing under an assumption you don’t believe in isn’t valuable.
Why would believing Open Individualism to be true cause disinterest in cryonics? I would be ecstatic to continue working on what I love after my natural lifespan has ended.
I enthusiastically agree with Eliezer Yudkowsky that the utilitarian argument against cryonics is weak under the assumption of Closed Individualism. Even committed EA’s enjoy so many luxuries that there is no good reason why you can’t pay for cryonics if that’s what you value, especially if it helps you live with less fear (in which case it’s an investment).
However, if you’re an open individualist, there is no reason to be afraid anyway, so I don’t see why you would spend the ~200.000$ on cryonics when you can use it for higher priority causes instead. I don’t have any moral qualms with it, I just don’t see the motivation. I don’t think I’m happy or smart enough for it to be worth it, and I don’t really care if my identity is preserved in this particular form. I just care about having positive experiences.
(I still approve of advertising cryonics for practical reasons. It may change the behavior of powerful people if they believe they have skin in the game.)
“It feels strange to me, somewhat analogous to arguing that Bigfoot can’t do magic while neglecting to mention that he also doesn’t exist.”
I assumed that the assumptions used would resonate with people. I used to believe in a rigid soul like concept of identity when I was a child, likely stemming from my religious upbringing. Thinking of an argument similar to what I wrote is what relaxed my once rigid view of identity.
″...I don’t really care if my identity is preserved in this particular form. I just care about having positive experiences.”
I think this is where we differ. I don’t value my life mostly for positive experiences. There are many others who enjoy the same things I enjoy and their experience is no more or less valuable in an objective sense than mine. However, I value the unique things that I can imprint on the world. Others may create art similar to mine, but it is unlikely to be exactly the same. The potentiality of the universe is limited if I am not around to affect things. The more unique agents doing unique things the more personally interesting variation there is in the universe. I care about potentiality and variation. What I most despise in the universe is a loss of potential. Forced or chosen death is a loss of potential. I can accept chosen death, but only from ones who are fully aware of the consequences such as you. I cannot accept death chosen from ignorance, which is why I exert so much effort trying to convince people that identity is not such a rigid matter.
One can argue that potentiality is relative, that the ceasing of myself would allow others to do things that they would not be able to do if I were alive. When I say potentiality I mean potential variations of the universe that excite me personally.
“There is an assumption here that your future self shares an identity with your current self that other people don’t, which is called Closed Individualism.”
I actually wrote the argument for people who believe in Closed Individualism. I myself subscribe to Open Individualism. The purpose was to convince people who subscribe to Closed Individualism to not reject cryonics on the basis that their identity will be lost. Some people, even if revived after cryonics, may worry that their identity has fundamentally changed which can lead to an existential crisis.
“I’m not saying that Open Individualism is definitely true, but Closed Individualism is almost certainly not true, and that’s enough to be disinterested in cryonics.”
Why would believing Open Individualism to be true cause disinterest in cryonics? I would be ecstatic to continue working on what I love after my natural lifespan has ended. A few centuries of life experience could give so much depth to art that cannot be gained through only 80 years.
That’s interesting, both because I wouldn’t expect an Open Individualist to be interested in cryonics, and because I wouldn’t expect an OI to make this argument. Do you agree that you could prove much stronger claims about identity with equal validity?
It feels strange to me, somewhat analogous to arguing that Bigfoot can’t do magic while neglecting to mention that he also doesn’t exist. But I’m not saying that arguing under an assumption you don’t believe in isn’t valuable.
I enthusiastically agree with Eliezer Yudkowsky that the utilitarian argument against cryonics is weak under the assumption of Closed Individualism. Even committed EA’s enjoy so many luxuries that there is no good reason why you can’t pay for cryonics if that’s what you value, especially if it helps you live with less fear (in which case it’s an investment).
However, if you’re an open individualist, there is no reason to be afraid anyway, so I don’t see why you would spend the ~200.000$ on cryonics when you can use it for higher priority causes instead. I don’t have any moral qualms with it, I just don’t see the motivation. I don’t think I’m happy or smart enough for it to be worth it, and I don’t really care if my identity is preserved in this particular form. I just care about having positive experiences.
(I still approve of advertising cryonics for practical reasons. It may change the behavior of powerful people if they believe they have skin in the game.)
“It feels strange to me, somewhat analogous to arguing that Bigfoot can’t do magic while neglecting to mention that he also doesn’t exist.”
I assumed that the assumptions used would resonate with people. I used to believe in a rigid soul like concept of identity when I was a child, likely stemming from my religious upbringing. Thinking of an argument similar to what I wrote is what relaxed my once rigid view of identity.
″...I don’t really care if my identity is preserved in this particular form. I just care about having positive experiences.”
I think this is where we differ. I don’t value my life mostly for positive experiences. There are many others who enjoy the same things I enjoy and their experience is no more or less valuable in an objective sense than mine. However, I value the unique things that I can imprint on the world. Others may create art similar to mine, but it is unlikely to be exactly the same. The potentiality of the universe is limited if I am not around to affect things. The more unique agents doing unique things the more personally interesting variation there is in the universe. I care about potentiality and variation. What I most despise in the universe is a loss of potential. Forced or chosen death is a loss of potential. I can accept chosen death, but only from ones who are fully aware of the consequences such as you. I cannot accept death chosen from ignorance, which is why I exert so much effort trying to convince people that identity is not such a rigid matter.
One can argue that potentiality is relative, that the ceasing of myself would allow others to do things that they would not be able to do if I were alive. When I say potentiality I mean potential variations of the universe that excite me personally.