There is no sharp distinction between the ways in which physicists and philosophers of physics approach foundational questions in physics. As an example, Carroll’s recent paper on self-locating belief and MWI is based on ideas that are heavily pre-figured in the philosophical literature.
I am extremely skeptical about this topic, actually, because there is no way to test it out as I can see, without twisting the definition of testing beyond recognition. Carroll is all like “we derive the Born rule from these reasonable assumptions, therefore MWI”, and “it’s not an interpretation, it’s a formulation”, but until he can convince Bohmians or QBists that they are wrong and he is right, I will remain unimpressed.
Many philosophers, especially philosophers of science, are currently engaged in precisely the sort of “hacking away at the edges” problem-solving you endorse. Perhaps you don’t see this as a distinctively “philosophical” mode of problem-solving, but that’s a semantic quibble.
Absolutely, I don’t care how it is called, as long as it is done. I would appreciate a few links to papers which do that, just to understand what you are talking about.
I would appreciate a few links to papers which do that, just to understand what you are talking about.
Most of Dan Dennett’s work adopts the methodology you endorse, and as a bonus, it is usually very readable. A good example is the pair of papers, True Believers and Real Patterns.
Since you’re a GR guy, you may enjoy the work of David Malament and John Earman, both of whom have written a lot of interesting stuff on foundational issues in GR. Try this paper by Malament. The first two sections are basically just survey, but in the third section he presents some of his original work, with references to papers where he discusses the issues in more detail.
Huw Price (one of the founders of the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at Cambridge) has done a lot of cool work on time, among other topics. Examples: this paper and this paper.
Philip Pettit is a political philosopher who uses social choice theory to address philosophical questions (in the tradition of Rawls, whose Theory of Justice is an excellent example of hacking at the edges). Many of his papers are worth reading. Here’s an example.
Christopher Hitchcock does good work on causation. Here’s an interesting paper he co-wrote with Joshua Knobe on how our judgments about causation are tied up with normative notions.
You can’t test interpretations. That’s why they’re called interpretations. It’s not that anyone is rejecting empiricism, it is that empirical tests aren’t available just because you want them to be.
I am extremely skeptical about this topic, actually, because there is no way to test it out as I can see, without twisting the definition of testing beyond recognition. Carroll is all like “we derive the Born rule from these reasonable assumptions, therefore MWI”, and “it’s not an interpretation, it’s a formulation”, but until he can convince Bohmians or QBists that they are wrong and he is right, I will remain unimpressed.
Absolutely, I don’t care how it is called, as long as it is done. I would appreciate a few links to papers which do that, just to understand what you are talking about.
Most of Dan Dennett’s work adopts the methodology you endorse, and as a bonus, it is usually very readable. A good example is the pair of papers, True Believers and Real Patterns.
Since you’re a GR guy, you may enjoy the work of David Malament and John Earman, both of whom have written a lot of interesting stuff on foundational issues in GR. Try this paper by Malament. The first two sections are basically just survey, but in the third section he presents some of his original work, with references to papers where he discusses the issues in more detail.
Huw Price (one of the founders of the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at Cambridge) has done a lot of cool work on time, among other topics. Examples: this paper and this paper.
Philip Pettit is a political philosopher who uses social choice theory to address philosophical questions (in the tradition of Rawls, whose Theory of Justice is an excellent example of hacking at the edges). Many of his papers are worth reading. Here’s an example.
Christopher Hitchcock does good work on causation. Here’s an interesting paper he co-wrote with Joshua Knobe on how our judgments about causation are tied up with normative notions.
Thank you for giving links to papers.
You can’t test interpretations. That’s why they’re called interpretations. It’s not that anyone is rejecting empiricism, it is that empirical tests aren’t available just because you want them to be.