The point of the simplistic two stage model is to avoid the false dichotomy of the”it’s either all random or all determined” . Two stage models have the indetrmimism needed for free choice occurring at one place and time, and determinism need to carry out actions occurring another.
That doesn’t get lost in more sophisticated versions.
A simplistic computer programme might perform calculation A, and then serially perform calculation B once A has finished.
You could rewrite that so that A and B run in parallel, with A pipelining it’s results to B.
But A and B would still be performing conceptually distinct roles..and that is the point.
...the more it’s predictable..
You can’t predict that an earlier option will definitely occur, and you also can’t predict which option occurs earliest. At best you have statistical predictability..
Critics have smacked down Kane...
Subjective opinion.
theology/incentives
You’re fee of incentives? It’s not the case that you hate FW because you’re an atheist and it seems theistic?
The point of the simplistic two stage model is to avoid the false dichotomy of the”it’s either all random or all determined” . Two stage models have the indetrmimism needed for free choice occurring at one place and time, and determinism need to carry out actions occurring another.
Yes, that’s the attempted goal. How is it relevant in this context?
You can’t predict that an earlier option will definitely occur, and you also can’t predict which option occurs earliest. At best you have statistical predictability..
So? The point that we are getting more and more ability to predict as we get more data is exactly what determinism suggests.
theology/incentives
You’re fee of incentives? It’s not the case that you hate FW because you’re an atheist and it seems theistic?
It would help a lot if you would not add things in quotes that don’t appear- it is both annoying and it makes it difficult to figure out exactly what you are responding. It is even less helpful when I just asked you clarify last time whether you are talking about a specific paragraph. I tentatively presume from context that you are responding to my final paragraph. I’ll respond under that interpretation: Sure, incentives are always a problem, and we all need to be careful about them. In my own case, I don’t think that I “hate FW” so it seems problematic to ask if “I hate FW because of X” for any X. If you mean something like “Do you discount free will because you’re an atheist and it seems theistic?” then I have to answer that I suspect that isn’t the case. Belief in free will doesn’t strike me as connected to theism much at all except in so far as they are both motivated by human intuitions, which applies to a lot of things (some of which are correct, others not so). I cannot rule out some other motivation at work, but I suspect that that’s not the case here. But it also isn’t that relevant: if I’m easily lead astray by my own motivations (and likely I am in many ways), that doesn’t make it less of a problem that that’s happening for a lot of professional philosophers.
Who’s incentivising Kane and co?
The question to a large extent here is not “who” but “what”- that is one thing they both share a similarity, a need to fill in deep seated intuitions. In this case, the near universal intuition that we have choices about our actions. I strongly share that intuition, and I sometimes think to myself “But I made that choice” even as I’m intellectually sure that the free will argument is extremely weak.
The point of the simplistic two stage model is to avoid the false dichotomy of the”it’s either all random or all determined” . Two stage models have the indetrmimism needed for free choice occurring at one place and time, and determinism need to carry out actions occurring another.
That doesn’t get lost in more sophisticated versions.
A simplistic computer programme might perform calculation A, and then serially perform calculation B once A has finished.
You could rewrite that so that A and B run in parallel, with A pipelining it’s results to B.
But A and B would still be performing conceptually distinct roles..and that is the point.
You can’t predict that an earlier option will definitely occur, and you also can’t predict which option occurs earliest. At best you have statistical predictability..
Subjective opinion.
You’re fee of incentives? It’s not the case that you hate FW because you’re an atheist and it seems theistic?
Who’s incentivising Kane and co?
Yes, that’s the attempted goal. How is it relevant in this context?
So? The point that we are getting more and more ability to predict as we get more data is exactly what determinism suggests.
It would help a lot if you would not add things in quotes that don’t appear- it is both annoying and it makes it difficult to figure out exactly what you are responding. It is even less helpful when I just asked you clarify last time whether you are talking about a specific paragraph. I tentatively presume from context that you are responding to my final paragraph. I’ll respond under that interpretation: Sure, incentives are always a problem, and we all need to be careful about them. In my own case, I don’t think that I “hate FW” so it seems problematic to ask if “I hate FW because of X” for any X. If you mean something like “Do you discount free will because you’re an atheist and it seems theistic?” then I have to answer that I suspect that isn’t the case. Belief in free will doesn’t strike me as connected to theism much at all except in so far as they are both motivated by human intuitions, which applies to a lot of things (some of which are correct, others not so). I cannot rule out some other motivation at work, but I suspect that that’s not the case here. But it also isn’t that relevant: if I’m easily lead astray by my own motivations (and likely I am in many ways), that doesn’t make it less of a problem that that’s happening for a lot of professional philosophers.
The question to a large extent here is not “who” but “what”- that is one thing they both share a similarity, a need to fill in deep seated intuitions. In this case, the near universal intuition that we have choices about our actions. I strongly share that intuition, and I sometimes think to myself “But I made that choice” even as I’m intellectually sure that the free will argument is extremely weak.
If what you are predicting X from is indeterministic, X is indeterministic. Cf the thermal noise result.
It is matter of fact that chairs in theology are funded the way they are. It’s your opinion that people have the motivations you think.
In any case, if you can explain common intuitions, why reject them?