My underlying motive is quite different. For example, I do not think that metaphysics is against free will. My root position is that thinking from a given perspective, i.e. that each of our own first-person perspectives, is the foundation of reasoning. From there we imagine thinking as other people or things, some part of reasoning remains unchanged with such perspective switches, which gives the idea of objectivity. Nonetheless, reasoning is ultimately based on perspectives, so perspective (and self) shall be regarded as primitive.
This is why I think the Copenhagen-type interpretations got it right: the existence of an observer that is physically unexplainable by reductionism is to be expected. And free will is something experienced by the first-person, by whatever that is regarded as the observer. So free will is not something inside physics’ domain.
I also noticed you discussed the absent-minded driver. I consider “the probability that here is X” is not a valid concept. Because here is perspective defined, using that like its meaning is apparent means reasoning from the perspective of the driver at that moment. So here is primitive, there is no way to analyze the probability. In general self-locating probabilities in anthropics are invalid.
My position is similar to dualistic agency. If we want to analyze the decision-maker, then we use physical reductionism. If we want to reason as the first-person, then free will must be a premise in decision-making. The point is, we should not switch perspectives halfway and mix the two analyses, which Newcomb’s paradox does.
I definitely agree with the last paragraph, stick with one perspective. To the predictor you are an algorithm that either one-boxes or not. There is nothing more to design.
I agree with you on self-locating probabilities not being a useful concept for making optimal decisions. However, in the absent-minded driver problem turning with the probability 2⁄3 to optimize your payout is not talking about a self-locating probability. Not sure if that is what you meant.
I don’t understand the point about the Copenhagen-type interpretation at all...
As for the free will, metaphysics is definitely not against it, physics is. The feeling of free will is a human cognitive artifact, not anything reducible or emergent. But it doesn’t seem useful to argue this point.
Turning with the probability of 2⁄3 is not a self-locating probability. It is a valid decision. What is not valid is when at an intersection ask “what is the probability that here is X?”, this is a self-locating probability. It needs to employ the first-person perspective to make sense of “here”, while also needs a god’s eye view to treat the location as unknown. i.e. mixing two perspectives. We can’t assign a value to it then make a decision basing on that.
If we consider perspective as fundamental in reasoning then physics cannot be regarded as the description of an objective reality, rather it is the description of how the world interacts with a perspective center. So physics not describing the observer itself is to be expected. Yet free will (and subjective experience in general) are only relevant to the self. So physics cannot be against free will as it is not something within its domain of study.
That is all assuming perspective is the fundamental form of reasoning. If we consider objective reasoning as fundamental, then physics as the description of the objective reality is the foundation of any perspective experiences such as free will. And it would be right to say free will is not compatible with physics.
The former considers reasoning as the first-person as the foundation, the other considers reasoning objectively as the foundation.
My underlying motive is quite different. For example, I do not think that metaphysics is against free will. My root position is that thinking from a given perspective, i.e. that each of our own first-person perspectives, is the foundation of reasoning. From there we imagine thinking as other people or things, some part of reasoning remains unchanged with such perspective switches, which gives the idea of objectivity. Nonetheless, reasoning is ultimately based on perspectives, so perspective (and self) shall be regarded as primitive.
This is why I think the Copenhagen-type interpretations got it right: the existence of an observer that is physically unexplainable by reductionism is to be expected. And free will is something experienced by the first-person, by whatever that is regarded as the observer. So free will is not something inside physics’ domain.
I also noticed you discussed the absent-minded driver. I consider “the probability that here is X” is not a valid concept. Because here is perspective defined, using that like its meaning is apparent means reasoning from the perspective of the driver at that moment. So here is primitive, there is no way to analyze the probability. In general self-locating probabilities in anthropics are invalid.
My position is similar to dualistic agency. If we want to analyze the decision-maker, then we use physical reductionism. If we want to reason as the first-person, then free will must be a premise in decision-making. The point is, we should not switch perspectives halfway and mix the two analyses, which Newcomb’s paradox does.
I definitely agree with the last paragraph, stick with one perspective. To the predictor you are an algorithm that either one-boxes or not. There is nothing more to design.
I agree with you on self-locating probabilities not being a useful concept for making optimal decisions. However, in the absent-minded driver problem turning with the probability 2⁄3 to optimize your payout is not talking about a self-locating probability. Not sure if that is what you meant.
I don’t understand the point about the Copenhagen-type interpretation at all...
As for the free will, metaphysics is definitely not against it, physics is. The feeling of free will is a human cognitive artifact, not anything reducible or emergent. But it doesn’t seem useful to argue this point.
Turning with the probability of 2⁄3 is not a self-locating probability. It is a valid decision. What is not valid is when at an intersection ask “what is the probability that here is X?”, this is a self-locating probability. It needs to employ the first-person perspective to make sense of “here”, while also needs a god’s eye view to treat the location as unknown. i.e. mixing two perspectives. We can’t assign a value to it then make a decision basing on that.
If we consider perspective as fundamental in reasoning then physics cannot be regarded as the description of an objective reality, rather it is the description of how the world interacts with a perspective center. So physics not describing the observer itself is to be expected. Yet free will (and subjective experience in general) are only relevant to the self. So physics cannot be against free will as it is not something within its domain of study.
That is all assuming perspective is the fundamental form of reasoning. If we consider objective reasoning as fundamental, then physics as the description of the objective reality is the foundation of any perspective experiences such as free will. And it would be right to say free will is not compatible with physics.
The former considers reasoning as the first-person as the foundation, the other considers reasoning objectively as the foundation.