I’m not trying to argue for a general inversion of the principle, ie. I’m not suggesting that non-consent is somehow automatically justified. Mostly I was observing the thing where two people on “opposite” sides of an issue nonetheless have major unstated premises in common, and without those premises the contention between them dissolves.
As I alluded to by saying “left as an exercise to the reader”, I don’t have a full explanation at the ready about the ethics of non-consensuality. Mostly I just wanted to bring the readers’ attention to the way in which consensualism is being assumed by the above, and that the argument fails hard in the cases where consensualism is rejected or simply doesn’t apply.
(If I were to make a general gesture towards the ethics of non-consent, I would start by talking about the phenomenon of dependency, where one party explicitly requires the cooperation of another party in order to live. Such dependency relations are by definition unequal, and in the natural world they are also often non-consensual, but despite these features they still place binding moral obligations on both parties.)
I’m not trying to argue for a general inversion of the principle, ie. I’m not suggesting that non-consent is somehow automatically justified. Mostly I was observing the thing where two people on “opposite” sides of an issue nonetheless have major unstated premises in common, and without those premises the contention between them dissolves.
As I alluded to by saying “left as an exercise to the reader”, I don’t have a full explanation at the ready about the ethics of non-consensuality. Mostly I just wanted to bring the readers’ attention to the way in which consensualism is being assumed by the above, and that the argument fails hard in the cases where consensualism is rejected or simply doesn’t apply.
(If I were to make a general gesture towards the ethics of non-consent, I would start by talking about the phenomenon of dependency, where one party explicitly requires the cooperation of another party in order to live. Such dependency relations are by definition unequal, and in the natural world they are also often non-consensual, but despite these features they still place binding moral obligations on both parties.)