I try to feed “not existing” into my brain’s utility evaluation module (a.k.a. the “how would I feel if this happened” test) and all it returns is confusion. On the pleasure-pain hedonism scale, not existing doesn’t evaluate to zero, it evaluates to “syntax error”. I can easily calculate that my sudden death would make the world a worse place, but I can’t figure out if I should prefer a world in which my mom had a genetically different child (who would then grow up to be a person that isn’t “me”) to one in which “I” exist.
Of all the possible worlds, why should I prefer those in which “I” came into existence to those in which someone else existed instead? Similarly, why should I prefer a distant future in which I’m resurrected from cryonic suspension to one in which I’m not?
Agree that the utility of death is undefined on the hedonic scale. Still gotta measure it somehow.
why should I prefer those in which “I” came into existence to those in which someone else existed instead? Similarly, why should I prefer a distant future in which I’m resurrected from cryonic suspension to one in which I’m not?
This is not similar! The you algorithm is currently embodied and running. Making it stop running forever, whether by dropping a piano on your head or by neglecting to thaw you, kills you. I don’t want people to die, and I don’t think you do either.
I am indifferent between various people being born, and I think indifferent to how many are born, except insofar as they will lead good or bad lives. You don’t seem to be a very happy person, so I wish you’d never been born. (Zing.) But we can’t unbirth you, and clever tricks like pretending you already die and we have an opportunity to birth you again won’t help.
But we can’t unbirth you, and clever tricks like pretending you already die and we have an opportunity to birth you again won’t help.
I’m not so sure; “you’ve already died and we have an opportunity to birth you again” isn’t very relevant to the question of whether one should commit suicide or not, but it does seem, to me, to be exactly what cryonics is offering.
It seems like most of the external effects of my death happen regardless of whether I’m revived from cryonic suspension or not. Suppose that a piano is about to fall on my head, but at the last minute, a wormhole opens up beneath me, and I end up in the middle of the Delta Quadrant surrounded by friendly, English-speaking aliens. ;) Now, in this (silly) scenario, I happen to be alive and well, but everyone else saw me get flattened by a falling piano and thinks I’m dead. As far as its effect on the rest of the Earth is concerned, this is basically just as bad as if the piano actually did hit me: my family and friends will still grieve, etc. And since all I get is confusion when I ask myself if it is better for me if I exist or not, I don’t know if I have a reason to prefer “piano + wormhole” to “piano + splat”. (Ignore the effect my presence will have on the aliens.)
I prefer you not to die even if I don’t know about it. I’m allowed to have preferences about events I can’t observe and there’s nothing you can do about it, so there.
Also, wouldn’t people you care about we happier hoping you’ll make it to the future than knowing you’re dead and gone? Some of them might even be around when you get thawed.
I try to feed “not existing” into my brain’s utility evaluation module (a.k.a. the “how would I feel if this happened” test) and all it returns is confusion. On the pleasure-pain hedonism scale, not existing doesn’t evaluate to zero, it evaluates to “syntax error”. I can easily calculate that my sudden death would make the world a worse place, but I can’t figure out if I should prefer a world in which my mom had a genetically different child (who would then grow up to be a person that isn’t “me”) to one in which “I” exist.
Of all the possible worlds, why should I prefer those in which “I” came into existence to those in which someone else existed instead? Similarly, why should I prefer a distant future in which I’m resurrected from cryonic suspension to one in which I’m not?
Agree that the utility of death is undefined on the hedonic scale. Still gotta measure it somehow.
This is not similar! The you algorithm is currently embodied and running. Making it stop running forever, whether by dropping a piano on your head or by neglecting to thaw you, kills you. I don’t want people to die, and I don’t think you do either.
I am indifferent between various people being born, and I think indifferent to how many are born, except insofar as they will lead good or bad lives. You don’t seem to be a very happy person, so I wish you’d never been born. (Zing.) But we can’t unbirth you, and clever tricks like pretending you already die and we have an opportunity to birth you again won’t help.
I’m not so sure; “you’ve already died and we have an opportunity to birth you again” isn’t very relevant to the question of whether one should commit suicide or not, but it does seem, to me, to be exactly what cryonics is offering.
It seems like most of the external effects of my death happen regardless of whether I’m revived from cryonic suspension or not. Suppose that a piano is about to fall on my head, but at the last minute, a wormhole opens up beneath me, and I end up in the middle of the Delta Quadrant surrounded by friendly, English-speaking aliens. ;) Now, in this (silly) scenario, I happen to be alive and well, but everyone else saw me get flattened by a falling piano and thinks I’m dead. As far as its effect on the rest of the Earth is concerned, this is basically just as bad as if the piano actually did hit me: my family and friends will still grieve, etc. And since all I get is confusion when I ask myself if it is better for me if I exist or not, I don’t know if I have a reason to prefer “piano + wormhole” to “piano + splat”. (Ignore the effect my presence will have on the aliens.)
I prefer you not to die even if I don’t know about it. I’m allowed to have preferences about events I can’t observe and there’s nothing you can do about it, so there.
Also, wouldn’t people you care about we happier hoping you’ll make it to the future than knowing you’re dead and gone? Some of them might even be around when you get thawed.