Would you still one-box even if Omega only got it right 99% of the time rather than 100%.
If so, then under the reasonable assumption that low-level quantum non-determinism does not usually have large effects on higher level brain-state, Newcomb’s problem is still physically implementable.
1000000 x 0.99 + 0 x 0.01 > 1001000 x 0.01 + 1000 * 0.99 so yes. But this is rather besides (my) point. As I pointed out if my aim is to make money I do everything to make Omega’s job as easy as possible (by precommiting) and then onebox (if Omega is any better than random).
My point is rather that Omega can be fooled regardless of it’s power. - And fooled throughly enough that Omegas percision can be no better than random
What makes you think you have a reliable way of fooling Omega?
In particular, I am extremely sceptical that simply not making your mind up, and then at the last minute doing something that feels random, would actually correspond to making use of quantum nondeterminism. In particular, if individual neurons are reasonably deterministic, then regardless of quantum physics any human’s actions can be predicted pretty perfectly, at least on a 5⁄10 minute scale.
Alternatively, even if it is possible to be delibrately non-cooperative, the problem can just be changed so that if Omega notices you are deliberately making its judgement hard, then it just doesn’t fill the box. The problem in this version seems exactly as hard as Newcomb’s.
In particular, I am extremely sceptical that simply not making your mind up, and then at the last minute doing something that feels random, would actually correspond to making use of quantum nondeterminism. In particular, if individual neurons are reasonably deterministic, then regardless of quantum physics any human’s actions can be predicted pretty perfectly, at least on a 5⁄10 minute scale.
As stated in my post I am not sure about this either, though my reasoning is, that while memory is probably easy to read out, thinking is probably a chaotic process, where the outcome may depend on single action potentials, especially if the process does not heavily rely on things stored in memory. If a single action potential occurs can be determined by few—in the limit one—sodium ion(s) passing or not passing a channel. If a sodium Ion passes a channel is a quantum probabilistic process. Though as I said before I am not sure of this, so precommit to use a suitable device.
Alternatively, even if it is possible to be delibrately non-cooperative, the problem can just be changed so that if Omega notices you are deliberately making its judgement hard, then it just doesn’t fill the box. The problem in this version seems exactly as hard as Newcomb’s.
Would you still one-box even if Omega only got it right 99% of the time rather than 100%.
If so, then under the reasonable assumption that low-level quantum non-determinism does not usually have large effects on higher level brain-state, Newcomb’s problem is still physically implementable.
1000000 x 0.99 + 0 x 0.01 > 1001000 x 0.01 + 1000 * 0.99 so yes. But this is rather besides (my) point. As I pointed out if my aim is to make money I do everything to make Omega’s job as easy as possible (by precommiting) and then onebox (if Omega is any better than random).
My point is rather that Omega can be fooled regardless of it’s power. - And fooled throughly enough that Omegas percision can be no better than random
If you know this, you are capable of predicting your own actions. Do you think you’re smarter than Omega?
What makes you think you have a reliable way of fooling Omega?
In particular, I am extremely sceptical that simply not making your mind up, and then at the last minute doing something that feels random, would actually correspond to making use of quantum nondeterminism. In particular, if individual neurons are reasonably deterministic, then regardless of quantum physics any human’s actions can be predicted pretty perfectly, at least on a 5⁄10 minute scale.
Alternatively, even if it is possible to be delibrately non-cooperative, the problem can just be changed so that if Omega notices you are deliberately making its judgement hard, then it just doesn’t fill the box. The problem in this version seems exactly as hard as Newcomb’s.
As stated in my post I am not sure about this either, though my reasoning is, that while memory is probably easy to read out, thinking is probably a chaotic process, where the outcome may depend on single action potentials, especially if the process does not heavily rely on things stored in memory. If a single action potential occurs can be determined by few—in the limit one—sodium ion(s) passing or not passing a channel. If a sodium Ion passes a channel is a quantum probabilistic process. Though as I said before I am not sure of this, so precommit to use a suitable device.
Yep! Omega can of course do so.