IMO, the subjectivist epistemology of the ideal formalisms of learning/knowledge like Bayesian epistemology derived from Bayes’s theorem, or Solomonoff Induction/AIXI is actually correct in the general case, and I think human intuitions about objectivity tend to be wrong in the general case.
There are 2 reasons for this:
The idealizations basically assume logical omnisicence, such that any objective mathematical truth already is there, meaning it captures all of the areas where humans are correct to be objectie already and more.
You can’t assume that the laws of physics treat everyone the same way, because there exist cases where different rules apply to different players, or even different patches of space (For example, Minecraft servers that have administrators that have the power to alter the rules at will, compared to regular users that have to treat the world as fixed for them personally).
You could argue that the very notion of objectivity is wrong for our universe specifically, but this is irrelevant to the argument.
The ideal epistemologies will incorporate objective physical laws as a special case of the proper class of all possible epistemic situations.
IMO, the subjectivist epistemology of the ideal formalisms of learning/knowledge like Bayesian epistemology derived from Bayes’s theorem, or Solomonoff Induction/AIXI is actually correct in the general case, and I think human intuitions about objectivity tend to be wrong in the general case.
There are 2 reasons for this:
The idealizations basically assume logical omnisicence, such that any objective mathematical truth already is there, meaning it captures all of the areas where humans are correct to be objectie already and more.
You can’t assume that the laws of physics treat everyone the same way, because there exist cases where different rules apply to different players, or even different patches of space (For example, Minecraft servers that have administrators that have the power to alter the rules at will, compared to regular users that have to treat the world as fixed for them personally).
You could argue that the very notion of objectivity is wrong for our universe specifically, but this is irrelevant to the argument.
The ideal epistemologies will incorporate objective physical laws as a special case of the proper class of all possible epistemic situations.