Consider that down voted. It’s too ambiguous. I can’t tell what you’re trying to say. Are you just nitpicking that both worlds have the same value on the t axis? Are you just signaling that you don’t believe in many worlds? Is there some subtlety of quantum mechanics I missed, you’d like to elaborate on? Are you just saying there’s no such thing as randomness?
I am trying to say that you use words in a careless and imprecise manner.
I also don’t “believe” in Many Worlds, though since there are guaranteed to be no empirical differences between the MWI and Copenhagen, I don’t care much about that belief: it pays no rent.
(The pot calls the kettle black.) Natural languages like English are informal. Some ambiguity can’t be helped. We do the best we can and ask clarifying questions. Was there a question in there?
guaranteed to be no empirical differences
Assuming Omega’s near-omniscience, we just found one! Omega can reliably predict the outcome of a quantum coin flip in a Copenhagen Universe, (since he knows the future), but can’t “predict” which branch we’ll end up in given a Many Worlds Multiverse, since we’ll be in both. (He knows the futures, but it doesn’t help.)
So let’s not assume that. Now we can both agree Omega is unrealistic, and only useful as a limiting case for real-world predictors. Since we know there’s no empirical difference between interpretations, it follows that any physical approximation of near-omniscience can’t predict the outcome of quantum coin flips. My strategy still works.
Ain’t no such thing.
Consider that down voted. It’s too ambiguous. I can’t tell what you’re trying to say. Are you just nitpicking that both worlds have the same value on the t axis? Are you just signaling that you don’t believe in many worlds? Is there some subtlety of quantum mechanics I missed, you’d like to elaborate on? Are you just saying there’s no such thing as randomness?
I am trying to say that you use words in a careless and imprecise manner.
I also don’t “believe” in Many Worlds, though since there are guaranteed to be no empirical differences between the MWI and Copenhagen, I don’t care much about that belief: it pays no rent.
And the winner is
(The pot calls the kettle black.) Natural languages like English are informal. Some ambiguity can’t be helped. We do the best we can and ask clarifying questions. Was there a question in there?
Assuming Omega’s near-omniscience, we just found one! Omega can reliably predict the outcome of a quantum coin flip in a Copenhagen Universe, (since he knows the future), but can’t “predict” which branch we’ll end up in given a Many Worlds Multiverse, since we’ll be in both. (He knows the futures, but it doesn’t help.)
So let’s not assume that. Now we can both agree Omega is unrealistic, and only useful as a limiting case for real-world predictors. Since we know there’s no empirical difference between interpretations, it follows that any physical approximation of near-omniscience can’t predict the outcome of quantum coin flips. My strategy still works.
You flip the quantum coin, it says “two box”.
You open one box. It’s empty. You open the other box. It’s empty.
You: WTF, man!
Omega: I am altering the deal, pray I don’t alter it any further.