I don’t know whether we live in a hard-takeoff singleton world or not. I think there is some evidence in that direction, e.g. from thinking about the kind of qualitative changes in AI algorithms that might come about in the future, and their implications on the capability growth curve, and also about the possibility of recursive self-improvement. But, the evidence is definitely far from conclusive (in any direction).
I think that the singleton world is definitely likely enough to merit some consideration. I also think that some of the same principles apply to some multipole worlds.
Commit to not make anyone predictably regret supporting the project or not opposing it” is worrying only by omission—it’s a good guideline, but it leaves the door open for “punish anyone who failed to support the project once the project gets the power to do so”.
Yes, I never imagined doing such a thing, but I definitely agree it should be made clear. Basically, don’t make threats, i.e. don’t try to shape others incentives in ways that they would be better off precommitting not to go along with it.
I don’t know whether we live in a hard-takeoff singleton world or not. I think there is some evidence in that direction, e.g. from thinking about the kind of qualitative changes in AI algorithms that might come about in the future, and their implications on the capability growth curve, and also about the possibility of recursive self-improvement. But, the evidence is definitely far from conclusive (in any direction).
I think that the singleton world is definitely likely enough to merit some consideration. I also think that some of the same principles apply to some multipole worlds.
Yes, I never imagined doing such a thing, but I definitely agree it should be made clear. Basically, don’t make threats, i.e. don’t try to shape others incentives in ways that they would be better off precommitting not to go along with it.