For most evolved creatures, it matters very little if their germ line is extingished in 10 years or 20 years—these outcomes are both germ-line extinction, they are both equally bad.
You have to use an accounting scheme which discounts extremely heavily for a few years for happiness to matter very much in the face of rapid eternal oblivion. Note that Yudkowsky advocates not discounting at all.
For most evolved creatures, it matters very little if their germ line is extinguished in 10 years or 20 years—these outcomes are both germ-line extinction, they are both equally bad.
If they’re equally bad, then congratulations—you’ve managed to make germ-line extinction not matter at all. Cause, see, that was going to happen eventually anyway, with the heat death if nothing else. If your reaction to learning that the universe is probably going to end wasn’t suicidal despair, I have to think you don’t actually believe what you’re saying.
I have to think you don’t actually believe what you’re saying.
I basically agree. I had said:
Humans aren’t “naturally” like that—at least only a small subset of memes convinces normal ones of the intellectual truth of the proposition “life has no meaning because/if you merely die at the end”.
I think it is important to untangle belief and belief in belief here. timtyler is talking about his beliefs and so is sharing his beliefs about his beliefs, and I don’t think he’s likely lying.
Extinction in 10 or 20 years would be regarded as being roughly equally bad—since these are small figures—smaller than the lifespan of humans and within their planning horizon. So an evolved creature acting in their genetic self-interest can be expected to regard both outcomes as being roughly equally bad.
In the case of 10 years and universal heat death, most evolved creatures would strongly prefer to avoid immediate extinction, since universal heat death is far outside both their experience and their planning horizon. As a bonus, there may be ways of avoiding the heat death—by creating large new low-entropy regions by using known inflationary processes.
Whoa, hold up—what does the lifespan and planning horizon of humans have to do with “most evolved creatures”? Plenty of things live less than ten years.
So: a mouse may not be able to conceive of “extinction of all its relatives in 20 years”. That might conceivably hinder it in making an adaptive decision—it’s brain is too small to understand the options.
Extinction in 10 or 20 years would be regarded as being roughly equally bad—since these are small figures smaller than the lifespan of humans and within their planning horizon. So an evolved creature acting in their genetic self-interest can be expected to regard both outcomes as being roughly equally bad.
I feel compelled to point out here that selection pressure pointing towards genetic/memetic fitness doesn’t necessarily imply explicit values oriented towards the same goal, merely values correlated with it, and even that can sometimes get fuzzy based on moral fashion or political forces. Explicitly legacy-oriented values clearly do exist, but they’re far from universal: compare Havamal 75 to Analects of Confucius 1:11 to Epicurus’ letter to Menoeceus to get three very different perspectives on the general topic of an enduring legacy.
Humans’ “explicit values” are not to be trusted either. Humans invent all kinks of bullshit stories about their values for the purpose of signalling to prospective partners how great they are so as to better manipulate them. They are like the priests who preach chastity and fidelity—and then roger the altar boy in “a moment of weakness”.
Sure, but the same goes for anyone talking about how life is meaningless because of the period at the end. We’re generally pretty terrible at making our explicit values consistent with out implicit objectives, but it doesn’t do much good to invoke an implicit goal to resolve explicit existential angst if we don’t acknowledge that goal in the first place.
Since humans and their culture evolved, there are not many humans that are very much like that.
Humans aren’t “naturally” like that—at least only a small subset of memes convinces normal ones of the intellectual truth of the proposition “life has no meaning because/if you merely die at the end”.
It is a valley of rationality sickness. If I get money now and there is an apocalypse later—such as perhaps the sun expanding to swallow the Earth (especially if we never colonize other places), or the heat death of the universe—I still consider it all worthwhile. The future in which I get a lot of stuff and then everyone dies in a cataclysm is much preferable to me to the one in which I don’t get a lot of stuff and everyone dies in a cataclysm.
After an apocalypse it would not matter much who has “profited”—since then all forms of currency are worthless.
This is why the proposed system has the payments happen before the apocalypse. Did you actually read the post?
For most evolved creatures, it matters very little if their germ line is extingished in 10 years or 20 years—these outcomes are both germ-line extinction, they are both equally bad.
You have to use an accounting scheme which discounts extremely heavily for a few years for happiness to matter very much in the face of rapid eternal oblivion. Note that Yudkowsky advocates not discounting at all.
If they’re equally bad, then congratulations—you’ve managed to make germ-line extinction not matter at all. Cause, see, that was going to happen eventually anyway, with the heat death if nothing else. If your reaction to learning that the universe is probably going to end wasn’t suicidal despair, I have to think you don’t actually believe what you’re saying.
I basically agree. I had said:
I think it is important to untangle belief and belief in belief here. timtyler is talking about his beliefs and so is sharing his beliefs about his beliefs, and I don’t think he’s likely lying.
Extinction in 10 or 20 years would be regarded as being roughly equally bad—since these are small figures—smaller than the lifespan of humans and within their planning horizon. So an evolved creature acting in their genetic self-interest can be expected to regard both outcomes as being roughly equally bad.
In the case of 10 years and universal heat death, most evolved creatures would strongly prefer to avoid immediate extinction, since universal heat death is far outside both their experience and their planning horizon. As a bonus, there may be ways of avoiding the heat death—by creating large new low-entropy regions by using known inflationary processes.
Whoa, hold up—what does the lifespan and planning horizon of humans have to do with “most evolved creatures”? Plenty of things live less than ten years.
So: a mouse may not be able to conceive of “extinction of all its relatives in 20 years”. That might conceivably hinder it in making an adaptive decision—it’s brain is too small to understand the options.
People don’t act in their genetic self-interest alone, and myself, I’d very much rather die childless in 20 years than die childless in 10 years.
This reminds me of “life has no meaning because/if you merely die at the end.”
That would only apply to those who assign no value to their genetic / memetic legacy.
Since humans and their culture evolved, there are not many humans that are very much like that.
I feel compelled to point out here that selection pressure pointing towards genetic/memetic fitness doesn’t necessarily imply explicit values oriented towards the same goal, merely values correlated with it, and even that can sometimes get fuzzy based on moral fashion or political forces. Explicitly legacy-oriented values clearly do exist, but they’re far from universal: compare Havamal 75 to Analects of Confucius 1:11 to Epicurus’ letter to Menoeceus to get three very different perspectives on the general topic of an enduring legacy.
Humans’ “explicit values” are not to be trusted either. Humans invent all kinks of bullshit stories about their values for the purpose of signalling to prospective partners how great they are so as to better manipulate them. They are like the priests who preach chastity and fidelity—and then roger the altar boy in “a moment of weakness”.
By their works ye shall know them.
Sure, but the same goes for anyone talking about how life is meaningless because of the period at the end. We’re generally pretty terrible at making our explicit values consistent with out implicit objectives, but it doesn’t do much good to invoke an implicit goal to resolve explicit existential angst if we don’t acknowledge that goal in the first place.
Humans aren’t “naturally” like that—at least only a small subset of memes convinces normal ones of the intellectual truth of the proposition “life has no meaning because/if you merely die at the end”.
It is a valley of rationality sickness. If I get money now and there is an apocalypse later—such as perhaps the sun expanding to swallow the Earth (especially if we never colonize other places), or the heat death of the universe—I still consider it all worthwhile. The future in which I get a lot of stuff and then everyone dies in a cataclysm is much preferable to me to the one in which I don’t get a lot of stuff and everyone dies in a cataclysm.