Yes, that’s fair. I’m over-reacting. To me it feels very like someone is standing next to a NYC subway exit handing out free kits for making dirty nuclear bombs that say things on the side like, “A billion civilians dead with each bomb!”, “Make it in your garage with a few tools from the hardware store!”, “Go down in history for changing the face of the world!”.
I want to stop that behavior even if nobody has yet been killed by the bombs and even if only 1 in 10 kits actually contains correct instructions.
As a bit of evidence that I’m not just totally imagining risks where there aren’t any… The recent Executive Order from the US Federal Gov contains a lot of detail about improving the regulation of DNA synthesis. I claim that the reason for this is that someone accurately pointed out to them that there are gaping holes in our current oversight, and that AI makes this vulnerability much more dangerous. And their experts then agreed that this was a risk worth addressing.
For example:
″ (i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies as the Director of OSTP may deem appropriate, shall establish a framework, incorporating, as appropriate, existing United States Government guidance, to encourage providers of synthetic nucleic acid sequences to implement comprehensive, scalable, and verifiable synthetic nucleic acid procurement screening mechanisms, including standards and recommended incentives. As part of this framework, the Director of OSTP shall:
(A) establish criteria and mechanisms for ongoing identification of biological sequences that could be used in a manner that would pose a risk to the national security of the United States; and
(B) determine standardized methodologies and tools for conducting and verifying the performance of sequence synthesis procurement screening, including customer screening approaches to support due diligence with respect to managing security risks posed by purchasers of biological sequences identified in subsection 4.4(b)(i)(A) of this section, and processes for the reporting of concerning activity to enforcement entities.”
Yes, that’s fair. I’m over-reacting. To me it feels very like someone is standing next to a NYC subway exit handing out free kits for making dirty nuclear bombs that say things on the side like, “A billion civilians dead with each bomb!”, “Make it in your garage with a few tools from the hardware store!”, “Go down in history for changing the face of the world!”.
I want to stop that behavior even if nobody has yet been killed by the bombs and even if only 1 in 10 kits actually contains correct instructions.
As a bit of evidence that I’m not just totally imagining risks where there aren’t any… The recent Executive Order from the US Federal Gov contains a lot of detail about improving the regulation of DNA synthesis. I claim that the reason for this is that someone accurately pointed out to them that there are gaping holes in our current oversight, and that AI makes this vulnerability much more dangerous. And their experts then agreed that this was a risk worth addressing.
For example:
″ (i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies as the Director of OSTP may deem appropriate, shall establish a framework, incorporating, as appropriate, existing United States Government guidance, to encourage providers of synthetic nucleic acid sequences to implement comprehensive, scalable, and verifiable synthetic nucleic acid procurement screening mechanisms, including standards and recommended incentives. As part of this framework, the Director of OSTP shall:
(A) establish criteria and mechanisms for ongoing identification of biological sequences that could be used in a manner that would pose a risk to the national security of the United States; and
(B) determine standardized methodologies and tools for conducting and verifying the performance of sequence synthesis procurement screening, including customer screening approaches to support due diligence with respect to managing security risks posed by purchasers of biological sequences identified in subsection 4.4(b)(i)(A) of this section, and processes for the reporting of concerning activity to enforcement entities.”