Some context. I do not, in fact, believe that Kaldor-Hicks efficent actions are inherently moral. But I do think that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a pretty good first-pass heuristic. This thought experiment was meant to set up a dilemma between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (which says to buy) and my moral intuitions (which says not to buy). The problem is that I can’t figure out exactly what my intuition is trying to tell me about what seems to be a fairly straightforward utility-maximizing transfer. For the purposes of this contrived thought experiment, suppose that the only decision is whether or not to buy from the commune. There isn’t an option to donate some or all of the money to GiveDirectly if I choose not to buy. Just buy a widget or buy $100 worth of ice cream.
Eh, I don’t put much weight on moral intuitions in deeply bizarre choices. That’s not what they’re evolved/trained on, and it seems designed to give odd responses. Examining one’s reaction can sometimes be interesting, but it isn’t a good guide to moral truth.
Your ice cream scenario isn’t about you spending $100, it’s about you choosing between ice cream and a commune-provided widget. I don’t see much of interest in that choice.
Past a certain point, this is certainly true. But you need a certain degree of reflection before you can tell whether further reflection is likely to produce valuable insights. Apparently you hit your limit, but I haven’t yet. If you have some reason why you think this is a particularly unenlightening thing to think about, I’d love to hear it, but this seems like a matter of different tastes.
See Vaniver’s comments below his answer for reasons I think this is worth thinking about. I basically agree with them.
Some context. I do not, in fact, believe that Kaldor-Hicks efficent actions are inherently moral. But I do think that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a pretty good first-pass heuristic. This thought experiment was meant to set up a dilemma between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (which says to buy) and my moral intuitions (which says not to buy). The problem is that I can’t figure out exactly what my intuition is trying to tell me about what seems to be a fairly straightforward utility-maximizing transfer. For the purposes of this contrived thought experiment, suppose that the only decision is whether or not to buy from the commune. There isn’t an option to donate some or all of the money to GiveDirectly if I choose not to buy. Just buy a widget or buy $100 worth of ice cream.
Eh, I don’t put much weight on moral intuitions in deeply bizarre choices. That’s not what they’re evolved/trained on, and it seems designed to give odd responses. Examining one’s reaction can sometimes be interesting, but it isn’t a good guide to moral truth.
Your ice cream scenario isn’t about you spending $100, it’s about you choosing between ice cream and a commune-provided widget. I don’t see much of interest in that choice.
Past a certain point, this is certainly true. But you need a certain degree of reflection before you can tell whether further reflection is likely to produce valuable insights. Apparently you hit your limit, but I haven’t yet. If you have some reason why you think this is a particularly unenlightening thing to think about, I’d love to hear it, but this seems like a matter of different tastes.
See Vaniver’s comments below his answer for reasons I think this is worth thinking about. I basically agree with them.