It seems like buying widgets would be more moral then, say, donating $80 to the same group of poor people ($80 - $80 = $0) because the widget purchase slightly compensates me for the donation in a way that is greater then the cost of the recipient to produce the widget.
It’s certainly not more moral (because the extra benefits flow to you, and that is generally not seen as a moral plus). But there are similar arguments for micro-loans rather than giving directly: the profit from the microloan means that you can offer more loans after.
I believe the empirical evidence is that that argument is wrong, but it’s certainly not wrong in theory. Similarly, if you could use the $30 worth of your widget to free up >$20 worth of value on your side, and donate that, then it would be more moral.
Basically trade typically adds more total value than donation, but a) donations can be targeted in ways trade can’t, and b) the total value added is not relevant to the receivers, just to yourself, unless you use that extra value to trade or donate more.
the extra benefits flow to you, and that is generally not seen as a moral plus
This is correct, but I’m not sure that it should be: there’s no intrinsic reason for why your well-being wouldn’t be just as important morally as everyone else’s. Empirically, people thinking that their own well-being doesn’t matter and only other people’s well-being does, seems to be a big factor in do-gooders burning out.
Yes, that’s true. But I’ve been kind of treating value-to-yourself as fungible. If it isn’t, and if the marginal utility gain for you is tiny, then trade is less interesting.
>It’s certainly not more moral (because the extra benefits flow to you, and that is generally not seen as a moral plus).
Not in the calculus as I run it. I consider a util to me, a util to Warren Buffett, and a util to an impoverished african farmer to be equivalent (insofar as interpersonal utility comparisons are possible etc. etc.). The only reason I consider a dollar donation to GiveDirectly>a dollar spent on ice cream>a dollar donation to Warren Buffett’s personal checking account is because “for a function to convert dollars to utils u($), u’($)>0, u″($)<0”.
>I believe the empirical evidence is that that argument is wrong, but it’s certainly not wrong in theory.
What empirical evidence? It’s a contrived thought experiment, not something I’m actually debating.
> the total value added is not relevant to the receivers, just to yourself, unless you use that extra value to trade or donate more.
Again, this is just plain wrong. Utilitarianism!=self-flagellation.
Even without self-flagellation, if your marginal utility per $ is much lower, and you don’t use your own surplus in a fungible way to donate/buy more, donating can be much higher impact than trade. First of all, you have more freedom to target donations that trade, and even if we ignore that, capturing all your money is better for the producer than just capturing the producer surplus (and the marginal utility of the consumer surplus to you is sufficiently low that adding it on doesn’t bring the surpluses to a higher number).
capturing all your money is better for the producer than just capturing the producer surplus (and the marginal utility of the consumer surplus to you is sufficiently low that adding it on doesn’t bring the surpluses to a higher number).
By assumption, the consumer surplus to me is $30. Which is high enough to bring the surpluses to a higher number. I’m not denying that there are slightly different constructions of the problem where donation is the trivially more moral action. That’s not the point, though. The point is that, in this particular scenario (where, by preference fulfillment/K-H efficiency, buying>donating>keeping my money) my moral intuition says to donate or keep the money. You’re making further assumptions (U(consumer surplus) is approximately 0) which make the problem easier, but less interesting.
It’s certainly not more moral (because the extra benefits flow to you, and that is generally not seen as a moral plus). But there are similar arguments for micro-loans rather than giving directly: the profit from the microloan means that you can offer more loans after.
I believe the empirical evidence is that that argument is wrong, but it’s certainly not wrong in theory. Similarly, if you could use the $30 worth of your widget to free up >$20 worth of value on your side, and donate that, then it would be more moral.
Basically trade typically adds more total value than donation, but a) donations can be targeted in ways trade can’t, and b) the total value added is not relevant to the receivers, just to yourself, unless you use that extra value to trade or donate more.
This is correct, but I’m not sure that it should be: there’s no intrinsic reason for why your well-being wouldn’t be just as important morally as everyone else’s. Empirically, people thinking that their own well-being doesn’t matter and only other people’s well-being does, seems to be a big factor in do-gooders burning out.
Yes, that’s true. But I’ve been kind of treating value-to-yourself as fungible. If it isn’t, and if the marginal utility gain for you is tiny, then trade is less interesting.
>It’s certainly not more moral (because the extra benefits flow to you, and that is generally not seen as a moral plus).
Not in the calculus as I run it. I consider a util to me, a util to Warren Buffett, and a util to an impoverished african farmer to be equivalent (insofar as interpersonal utility comparisons are possible etc. etc.). The only reason I consider a dollar donation to GiveDirectly>a dollar spent on ice cream>a dollar donation to Warren Buffett’s personal checking account is because “for a function to convert dollars to utils u($), u’($)>0, u″($)<0”.
>I believe the empirical evidence is that that argument is wrong, but it’s certainly not wrong in theory.
What empirical evidence? It’s a contrived thought experiment, not something I’m actually debating.
> the total value added is not relevant to the receivers, just to yourself, unless you use that extra value to trade or donate more.
Again, this is just plain wrong. Utilitarianism!=self-flagellation.
Even without self-flagellation, if your marginal utility per $ is much lower, and you don’t use your own surplus in a fungible way to donate/buy more, donating can be much higher impact than trade. First of all, you have more freedom to target donations that trade, and even if we ignore that, capturing all your money is better for the producer than just capturing the producer surplus (and the marginal utility of the consumer surplus to you is sufficiently low that adding it on doesn’t bring the surpluses to a higher number).
By assumption, the consumer surplus to me is $30. Which is high enough to bring the surpluses to a higher number. I’m not denying that there are slightly different constructions of the problem where donation is the trivially more moral action. That’s not the point, though. The point is that, in this particular scenario (where, by preference fulfillment/K-H efficiency, buying>donating>keeping my money) my moral intuition says to donate or keep the money. You’re making further assumptions (U(consumer surplus) is approximately 0) which make the problem easier, but less interesting.