Induction. You have uncertainty about the extent to which you care about different universes. If it turns out you don’t care about the born rule for one reason or another the universe you observe is an absurdly (as in probably-a-Boltzmann-brain absurd) tiny sliver of the multiverse, but if you do, it’s still an absurdly tiny sliver but immensely less so. You should anticipate as if the born rule is true, because if you don’t almost only care about world where it is true, then you care almost nothing about the current world, and being wrong in it doesn’t matter, relatively to otherwise.
Hmm, I’m terrible at explaining this stuff. But the tl;dr is basically that there’s this long complicated reason why you should anticipate and act this way and thus it’s true in the “the simple truth” sense, that’s mostly tangential to if it’s “true” in some specific philosophy paper sense.
Oh, interesting. So just as one should act as if one is Jesus if one seems to be Jesus, then one should act as if one cares about world-histories in proportion to their L2 measure if one seems to care about world-histories in proportion to their L2 measure and one happens to be in a world-history with relatively high L2 measure. And if probability is degree of caring, then the fact that one’s world history obeys the Born rule is evidence that one cares about world-histories in proportion to their L2 measure.
I take it you would prefer option 2 in my original comment, reduce anticipation to UDT, and explain away continuity of experience.
Have I correctly characterized your point of view?
Induction. You have uncertainty about the extent to which you care about different universes. If it turns out you don’t care about the born rule for one reason or another the universe you observe is an absurdly (as in probably-a-Boltzmann-brain absurd) tiny sliver of the multiverse, but if you do, it’s still an absurdly tiny sliver but immensely less so. You should anticipate as if the born rule is true, because if you don’t almost only care about world where it is true, then you care almost nothing about the current world, and being wrong in it doesn’t matter, relatively to otherwise.
Hmm, I’m terrible at explaining this stuff. But the tl;dr is basically that there’s this long complicated reason why you should anticipate and act this way and thus it’s true in the “the simple truth” sense, that’s mostly tangential to if it’s “true” in some specific philosophy paper sense.
Oh, interesting. So just as one should act as if one is Jesus if one seems to be Jesus, then one should act as if one cares about world-histories in proportion to their L2 measure if one seems to care about world-histories in proportion to their L2 measure and one happens to be in a world-history with relatively high L2 measure. And if probability is degree of caring, then the fact that one’s world history obeys the Born rule is evidence that one cares about world-histories in proportion to their L2 measure.
I take it you would prefer option 2 in my original comment, reduce anticipation to UDT, and explain away continuity of experience.
Have I correctly characterized your point of view?
Exactly! Much better than I could!