Eli, it’s too quick to dismiss placing moral value on all conscious creatures as “very warm-and-fuzzy”. If we’re psychologising, then we might equally say that working towards the well-being of all sentience reflects the cognitive style of a rule-bound hyper-systematiser. No, chickens aren’t going to win any Fields medals—though chickens can recognise logical relationships and perform transitive inferences (cf. the “pecking order”). But nonhuman animals can still experience states of extreme distress. Uncontrolled panic, for example, feels awful regardless of your species-identity. Such panic involves a complete absence or breakdown of reflective self-awareness—illustrating how the most intense forms of consciousness don’t involve sophisticated meta-cognition.
Either way, if we can ethically justify spending, say, $100,000 salvaging a 23-week-old human micro-preemie, then impartial benevolence dictates caring for beings of greater sentience and sapience as well—or at the very least, not actively harming them.
Hey, I already said that I actually do have some empathy and altruism for chickens. “Warm and fuzzy” isn’t an insult: it’s just another part of how our minds work that we don’t currently understand (like consciousness). My primary point is that we should hold off on assigning huge value to things prior to actually understanding what they are and how they work.
I’m pretty sure eli_sennesh is wondering if there’s any special meaning to your responses to him all starting with his name, considering that that’s not standard practice on LW (since the software keeps track of which comment a comment is a reply to).
Eli, it’s too quick to dismiss placing moral value on all conscious creatures as “very warm-and-fuzzy”. If we’re psychologising, then we might equally say that working towards the well-being of all sentience reflects the cognitive style of a rule-bound hyper-systematiser. No, chickens aren’t going to win any Fields medals—though chickens can recognise logical relationships and perform transitive inferences (cf. the “pecking order”). But nonhuman animals can still experience states of extreme distress. Uncontrolled panic, for example, feels awful regardless of your species-identity. Such panic involves a complete absence or breakdown of reflective self-awareness—illustrating how the most intense forms of consciousness don’t involve sophisticated meta-cognition.
Either way, if we can ethically justify spending, say, $100,000 salvaging a 23-week-old human micro-preemie, then impartial benevolence dictates caring for beings of greater sentience and sapience as well—or at the very least, not actively harming them.
Hey, I already said that I actually do have some empathy and altruism for chickens. “Warm and fuzzy” isn’t an insult: it’s just another part of how our minds work that we don’t currently understand (like consciousness). My primary point is that we should hold off on assigning huge value to things prior to actually understanding what they are and how they work.
Eli, fair point.
David, is this thing with the names a game?
Eli, sorry, could you elaborate? Thanks!
I’m pretty sure eli_sennesh is wondering if there’s any special meaning to your responses to him all starting with his name, considering that that’s not standard practice on LW (since the software keeps track of which comment a comment is a reply to).
(I think he’s wondering why you preface even very short comments with an address by first name)