Your theory may not match Tegmarks, but isn’t too far from Calmer’s ….implicitly dualistic theory.
I am well aware that you are probably not going to be able to explain everything with no arbitrary axioms but.....fallacy of gray.....where you stop is important. If an apparently high level property is stated as ontologocally fundamental, ie irreducible, that is the essence of dualism
I think it’s a mistake to consider consciousness a high-level property. Two electrons interacting are conscious, albeit briefly and in a very limited way.
I think it’s a mistake to consider consciousness a high-level property. Two electrons interacting are conscious, albeit briefly and in a very limited way.
This weakens the concept of consciousness so much as to make it no longer meaningful.
Your theory may not match Tegmarks, but isn’t too far from Calmer’s ….implicitly dualistic theory.
I am well aware that you are probably not going to be able to explain everything with no arbitrary axioms but.....fallacy of gray.....where you stop is important. If an apparently high level property is stated as ontologocally fundamental, ie irreducible, that is the essence of dualism
I think it’s a mistake to consider consciousness a high-level property. Two electrons interacting are conscious, albeit briefly and in a very limited way.
Is that a fact?
If consciousness is a lower level property...is it casually active?
And if it is a lower level property...why can’t I introspect a highly detailed brain scan?
This weakens the concept of consciousness so much as to make it no longer meaningful.
I don’t think so. It requires you to be much more precise about what it is that you care about when you are asking “is system X conscious?”