Both Eliezer and Robin Hanson have argued strongly against time discounting of utility.
I don’t understand, what are their arguments?
Isn’t time discounting mainly a result of risk aversion? What is wrong with being risk averse?
If an agent’s utility function does place more weight on a payoff that is nearer in time, should that agent alter its utility function? Rationality are heuristics used to satisfy one’s utility function. What heuristics are applicable when altering one’s own utility function?
The expected utility of the future can grow much faster than its prior probability shrinks. Without any time preferences, at what point does a rational agent stop its exploration and start the exploitation to actually “consume” utility?
I don’t understand, what are their arguments?
Isn’t time discounting mainly a result of risk aversion? What is wrong with being risk averse?
If an agent’s utility function does place more weight on a payoff that is nearer in time, should that agent alter its utility function? Rationality are heuristics used to satisfy one’s utility function. What heuristics are applicable when altering one’s own utility function?
The expected utility of the future can grow much faster than its prior probability shrinks. Without any time preferences, at what point does a rational agent stop its exploration and start the exploitation to actually “consume” utility?
Eliezer’s arguments here.
I think it is better to think of temporal discounting and risk aversion as orthogonal.
Exploration vs expolitation is based on what the utility function says.