It is bad to create a small population of creatures with humane values (that has positive welfare) and a large population of animals that are in pain. For instance, it is bad to create a population of animals with −75 total welfare, even if doing so allows you to create a population of humans with 50 total welfare.
Why do you believe this? I don’t. Due to wild animal suffering, this proposition implies that it would have been better if no life had appeared on Earth, assuming average human/animal welfare and the human/animal ratio don’t dramatically change in the future.
I do expect it to change in the far future as the human race (barring some extinction event) expands into space.
I am also a little skeptical of one of the author’s premises, I would not give up a significant portion of my lifespan (probably less than a week at most) to avoid a painful, but relatively brief death. I am concerned about the suffering wild animals feel in their day-to-day life, but I don’t think any painful deaths they experience are as significant as the author implies. I’m not expert enough to know how frequent predator encounters, starvation and other such things are among animals to know whether the average of their day-to-day life is mostly pain, I’m guessing it’s closer to neutral, but I can’t be sure.
I have also read some studies that suggest fear may be much more harmful than pain to animals, I have no idea what that implies.
Then there’s this, although I wouldn’t take it seriously at all, and neither does the author.
Another weird idea I don’t think anyone has considered before, what about the wants of animals, are they significant at all? It’s well known that humans can want things that do not give them pleasure (i.e. not wanting to be told a comforting lie). It seems like that is true of animals as well. If I knock out the part of a rat’s brain that likes food, and it still tries to get food (because it wants it) am I morally obligated to give it food?
Generally when I want things I don’t enjoy I can divide those wants into ego-syntonic wants that I consider part of my “true self” (i.e. wanting to be told the truth, even if it’s upsetting) versus ego-dystonic wants that I consider an encroachment on my true self I want to eliminate (like wanting to eat yet another potatoe chip). Since animals are not sapient, and so lack any reflective “true self” does that mean none of their wants matter, or all of them? If an animal gets what it wants does that make up for pain it has experienced, or not?
Still, you make a good point, maybe I should revise my opinion on this.
Why do you believe this? I don’t. Due to wild animal suffering, this proposition implies that it would have been better if no life had appeared on Earth, assuming average human/animal welfare and the human/animal ratio don’t dramatically change in the future.
I do expect it to change in the far future as the human race (barring some extinction event) expands into space.
I am also a little skeptical of one of the author’s premises, I would not give up a significant portion of my lifespan (probably less than a week at most) to avoid a painful, but relatively brief death. I am concerned about the suffering wild animals feel in their day-to-day life, but I don’t think any painful deaths they experience are as significant as the author implies. I’m not expert enough to know how frequent predator encounters, starvation and other such things are among animals to know whether the average of their day-to-day life is mostly pain, I’m guessing it’s closer to neutral, but I can’t be sure.
I have also read some studies that suggest fear may be much more harmful than pain to animals, I have no idea what that implies.
Then there’s this, although I wouldn’t take it seriously at all, and neither does the author.
Another weird idea I don’t think anyone has considered before, what about the wants of animals, are they significant at all? It’s well known that humans can want things that do not give them pleasure (i.e. not wanting to be told a comforting lie). It seems like that is true of animals as well. If I knock out the part of a rat’s brain that likes food, and it still tries to get food (because it wants it) am I morally obligated to give it food?
Generally when I want things I don’t enjoy I can divide those wants into ego-syntonic wants that I consider part of my “true self” (i.e. wanting to be told the truth, even if it’s upsetting) versus ego-dystonic wants that I consider an encroachment on my true self I want to eliminate (like wanting to eat yet another potatoe chip). Since animals are not sapient, and so lack any reflective “true self” does that mean none of their wants matter, or all of them? If an animal gets what it wants does that make up for pain it has experienced, or not?
Still, you make a good point, maybe I should revise my opinion on this.