As expected, you ignored the assumption that “charities themselves do not operate in an efficient market for expected utilons, so that the two top charities do not already have marginal expected utilities in perfect balance.”
No, I am not. I am expecting that the mechanism you may use to determine expected utilities has low probability of validity (low external probability of argument, if you wish) and thus you should end up assigning very close expected utilities to the top charities, simply due to the discounting for your method imprecision. It has nothing to do with some true frequentist expected utilities that charities have.
You’re essentially assuming that the variance of whatever prior you place on the utilities is very large in comparison to the differences between the expected utilities, which directly contradicts the assumption. Solve a different problem, get a different answer—how is that a surprise?
It has nothing to do with some true frequentist expected utilities that charities have.
Well at least you didn’t accuse me of rationalizing, being high on drugs, having a love affair with Hanson, etc...
You’re essentially assuming that the variance of whatever prior you place on the utilities is very large in comparison to the differences between the expected utilities, which directly contradicts the assumption. Solve a different problem, get a different answer—how is that a surprise?
What assumption? I am considering the real world donation case. People being pretty bad at choosing top charities, meaning, very poor correlation between people’s idea of top charity and actual charity quality.
Well at least you didn’t accuse me of rationalizing, being high on drugs, having a love affair with Hanson, etc...
Well, I am not aware of a post by you where you say that you take drugs to improve sanity, and describe the side effects of the drugs in some detail that is reminiscent of the very behaviour you display. And if you were to make such a post, and if I were to read it, if I would see you having something matching the side effects you described, I would probably mention it.
As expected, you ignored the assumption that “charities themselves do not operate in an efficient market for expected utilons, so that the two top charities do not already have marginal expected utilities in perfect balance.”
No, I am not. I am expecting that the mechanism you may use to determine expected utilities has low probability of validity (low external probability of argument, if you wish) and thus you should end up assigning very close expected utilities to the top charities, simply due to the discounting for your method imprecision. It has nothing to do with some true frequentist expected utilities that charities have.
You’re essentially assuming that the variance of whatever prior you place on the utilities is very large in comparison to the differences between the expected utilities, which directly contradicts the assumption. Solve a different problem, get a different answer—how is that a surprise?
Well at least you didn’t accuse me of rationalizing, being high on drugs, having a love affair with Hanson, etc...
What assumption? I am considering the real world donation case. People being pretty bad at choosing top charities, meaning, very poor correlation between people’s idea of top charity and actual charity quality.
Well, I am not aware of a post by you where you say that you take drugs to improve sanity, and describe the side effects of the drugs in some detail that is reminiscent of the very behaviour you display. And if you were to make such a post, and if I were to read it, if I would see you having something matching the side effects you described, I would probably mention it.