If being wireheaded is like being a really big positive integer, then being anti-wireheaded (i.e., having large amounts of pain directly injected into your brain) must be like being a really big negative integer. So I guess if you had to choose between the two, you’d be pretty much indifferent, right?
I wouldn’t be indifferent. If I had to choose between being wireheaded and being antiwireheaded, I would choose the former. I don’t simply assign utility = 0 to simple pleasure or pain. I just don’t think that wireheading is the most fun we could be having. If you asked someone on their deathbed what the best experiences of their life were, they probably wouldn’t talk about sex or heroin (yes, this might be an ineffectual status grab or selectively committing only certain types of fun to memory, but I doubt it).
This seems like a good example of logical rudeness to me. Your original comment was premised on an equivalence (which you explicitly spelled out later) between being wireheaded and being a large integer. I pointed out that accepting this premise would lead to indifference between wireheading and anti-wireheading. That was obviously meant to be a reductio ad absurdum. But you ignored the reductio and switched to talking about why wireheading is not the most fun we could be having.
To be clear, I don’t think wireheading is necessarily the most fun we could be having. I just think we don’t know enough about the nature of pleasure, fun, and/or preference to decide that right now.
You know, you’re right. That was a bit of a non sequitur.
Back to the original point, I think I’m starting to chang my mind about the equivalence between a wirehead and a number (insert disclaimer about how everything is a number): after all, I’d feel worse about killing one than tilting an abacus.
Maybe “But I don’t want to spend a lot of time doing something so simple” would work for version 3.0
If you were to ask me now what the best experiences of my life were, some of the sex I’ve had would definitely be up there, and I’ve had quite a variety of pleasurable experiences.
FWIW, I’m seeing his point better than I’m seeing yours at the moment, and I found uninverted’s argument convincing until I read Wei_Dai’s response. Try being more explicit?
I can’t get all that much more explicit. It’s near the level of raw logic and the ‘conclusion you suggest’ is included as a direct quote in case there was any doubt. Let’s see.
AI don’t want to be a really big integer! BIf you had to choose between being a really big integer and a really big negative integer, you’d be pretty much indifferent.
B is not implied by A.
I would have replaced my (grandparent) comment with the phrase ‘non sequitur’ except I wanted to acknowledge that Wei_Dai is almost certainly considering related issues beyond the conclusion he actually offered.
B is implied by “C Being any integer is of no value.” which I took as an unspoken assumption that’s shared between uninverted and I (and I thought it was likely that he accepts this assumption based on A). Does that answer your criticism, or not?
C seems likely to me based on A only if I assume D(uninverted is silly). That’s because there are other beliefs that could make one claim A that are more coherent than C. But let’s ignore this little side track and just state what we (probably) all agree on:
Being a positive integer isn’t particularly desirable.
Wireheading, orgasmium and positive floating point numbers or representations of 3(as many carats as fit in the galaxy here)3 are considered equivalent to ‘positive integer’ for most intents and purposes.
Being a negative integer is even worse than being a positive integer.
Being an integer at all is not that great.
Just being entropy sounds worse than just being a positive integer.
The universe ending up the same as if you weren’t in it at all sounds worse than being a positive integer. (Depending on intuitive aversion to oblivion and torment some would say worse than being any sort of integer.)
If we disagree on these statements then that will actually be interesting. And it is quite possible that there is disagreement even on these. I’ve often been surprised when people have different intuitions than I expect.
The force of the argument “I don’t want to be a really big integer” is that “being wireheaded takes away what makes me me, and so I stop being a person I can identify with and become a really big integer”. If that were so, the same would apply to anti-wireheading, and Wei Dai’s question would apply. If you agree that wireheading is more desirable than anti-wireheading, then this and other arguments that it’s not more desirable than any other state don’t directly apply.
“But I don’t want to be a structure whose chief component is a very large integer with a straightforward isomorphism to something else, namely some unspecified notion of ‘happiness’” is a little too cumbersome.
You will be gone and something which does want to be a big integer will replace you and use your resources more effectively. Both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism demand it.
Preference utilitarianism as I understand it implies nothing more than using utility to rank universe states. That doesn’t imply anything about what the most efficient use of matter is. As for hedonistic utilitarians, why would any existing mind want to build something like that or grow into something like that? Further, why would something like that be better at seizing resources?
I am using (total) preference utilitarianism to mean: “we should act so as to maximise the number of beings’ preferences that are satisfied anywhere at any time”.
“As for hedonistic utilitarians, why would any existing mind want to build something like that or grow into something like that?”
Because they are not selfish and they are concerned about the welfare of that being in proportion to its ability to have experiences?
“Further, why would something like that be better at seizing resources?”
That’s a weakness, but at some point we have to start switching from maximising resource capture to using those resources to generate good preference satisfaction (or good experiences if you’re a hedonist). At that point a single giant ‘utility monster’ seems most efficient.
My “abstract platonic score” is a measurement of my happiness, and my happiness is determined by the chemical processes of my brain. My video game score is a measure of my success playing a video game. If the number on the screen ceases to correlate well with the sort of success I care about, I will disregard it. I won’t be particularly thrilled if my score triples for no apparent reason, and I won’t be particularly thrilled if the number you are using to approximate my happiness triples either.
But I don’t want to be a really big integer!
If being wireheaded is like being a really big positive integer, then being anti-wireheaded (i.e., having large amounts of pain directly injected into your brain) must be like being a really big negative integer. So I guess if you had to choose between the two, you’d be pretty much indifferent, right?
I wouldn’t be indifferent. If I had to choose between being wireheaded and being antiwireheaded, I would choose the former. I don’t simply assign utility = 0 to simple pleasure or pain. I just don’t think that wireheading is the most fun we could be having. If you asked someone on their deathbed what the best experiences of their life were, they probably wouldn’t talk about sex or heroin (yes, this might be an ineffectual status grab or selectively committing only certain types of fun to memory, but I doubt it).
This seems like a good example of logical rudeness to me. Your original comment was premised on an equivalence (which you explicitly spelled out later) between being wireheaded and being a large integer. I pointed out that accepting this premise would lead to indifference between wireheading and anti-wireheading. That was obviously meant to be a reductio ad absurdum. But you ignored the reductio and switched to talking about why wireheading is not the most fun we could be having.
To be clear, I don’t think wireheading is necessarily the most fun we could be having. I just think we don’t know enough about the nature of pleasure, fun, and/or preference to decide that right now.
You know, you’re right. That was a bit of a non sequitur.
Back to the original point, I think I’m starting to chang my mind about the equivalence between a wirehead and a number (insert disclaimer about how everything is a number): after all, I’d feel worse about killing one than tilting an abacus.
Maybe “But I don’t want to spend a lot of time doing something so simple” would work for version 3.0
If you were to ask me now what the best experiences of my life were, some of the sex I’ve had would definitely be up there, and I’ve had quite a variety of pleasurable experiences.
You have a good point buried in there but the conclusion you suggest isn’t necessarily implied.
FWIW, I’m seeing his point better than I’m seeing yours at the moment, and I found uninverted’s argument convincing until I read Wei_Dai’s response. Try being more explicit?
I can’t get all that much more explicit. It’s near the level of raw logic and the ‘conclusion you suggest’ is included as a direct quote in case there was any doubt. Let’s see.
A I don’t want to be a really big integer!
B If you had to choose between being a really big integer and a really big negative integer, you’d be pretty much indifferent.
B is not implied by A.
I would have replaced my (grandparent) comment with the phrase ‘non sequitur’ except I wanted to acknowledge that Wei_Dai is almost certainly considering related issues beyond the conclusion he actually offered.
B is implied by “C Being any integer is of no value.” which I took as an unspoken assumption that’s shared between uninverted and I (and I thought it was likely that he accepts this assumption based on A). Does that answer your criticism, or not?
C seems likely to me based on A only if I assume D (uninverted is silly). That’s because there are other beliefs that could make one claim A that are more coherent than C. But let’s ignore this little side track and just state what we (probably) all agree on:
Being a positive integer isn’t particularly desirable.
Wireheading, orgasmium and positive floating point numbers or representations of 3(as many carats as fit in the galaxy here)3 are considered equivalent to ‘positive integer’ for most intents and purposes.
Being a negative integer is even worse than being a positive integer.
Being an integer at all is not that great.
Just being entropy sounds worse than just being a positive integer.
The universe ending up the same as if you weren’t in it at all sounds worse than being a positive integer. (Depending on intuitive aversion to oblivion and torment some would say worse than being any sort of integer.)
Fun is better than orgasmic integerness.
If we disagree on these statements then that will actually be interesting. And it is quite possible that there is disagreement even on these. I’ve often been surprised when people have different intuitions than I expect.
The force of the argument “I don’t want to be a really big integer” is that “being wireheaded takes away what makes me me, and so I stop being a person I can identify with and become a really big integer”. If that were so, the same would apply to anti-wireheading, and Wei Dai’s question would apply. If you agree that wireheading is more desirable than anti-wireheading, then this and other arguments that it’s not more desirable than any other state don’t directly apply.
If we take the alternative reasonable interpretation “takes away almost everything what makes me me”, no contradiction appears.
Yes, that makes sense.
I reject this combination of words and maintain my previous position.
Too late?
“But I don’t want to be a structure whose chief component is a very large integer with a straightforward isomorphism to something else, namely some unspecified notion of ‘happiness’” is a little too cumbersome.
You will be gone and something which does want to be a big integer will replace you and use your resources more effectively. Both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism demand it.
Preference utilitarianism as I understand it implies nothing more than using utility to rank universe states. That doesn’t imply anything about what the most efficient use of matter is. As for hedonistic utilitarians, why would any existing mind want to build something like that or grow into something like that? Further, why would something like that be better at seizing resources?
I am using (total) preference utilitarianism to mean: “we should act so as to maximise the number of beings’ preferences that are satisfied anywhere at any time”.
“As for hedonistic utilitarians, why would any existing mind want to build something like that or grow into something like that?”
Because they are not selfish and they are concerned about the welfare of that being in proportion to its ability to have experiences?
“Further, why would something like that be better at seizing resources?”
That’s a weakness, but at some point we have to start switching from maximising resource capture to using those resources to generate good preference satisfaction (or good experiences if you’re a hedonist). At that point a single giant ‘utility monster’ seems most efficient.
For reference, the “utilitarians” ’round these parts tend to be neither of those.
What are they then?
You are confusing a thing and its measurement.
If a video game uses an unsigned 32 bit integer for your score, then how would that integer differ from your (abstract platonic) score?
My “abstract platonic score” is a measurement of my happiness, and my happiness is determined by the chemical processes of my brain. My video game score is a measure of my success playing a video game. If the number on the screen ceases to correlate well with the sort of success I care about, I will disregard it. I won’t be particularly thrilled if my score triples for no apparent reason, and I won’t be particularly thrilled if the number you are using to approximate my happiness triples either.