Here, it is obvious from both an inside and outside perspective which version has continuity of experience, and thus from a legal standpoint, I think, it would make sense to regard Maia1 as having the same legal identity as the original, and recognize the need to create new documents and records for Maia2 -- even if there is no physical difference.
Personally, I would advise forking the legal identity, rather than creating an entirely new one. It needs to be recognised that Maia2 has as much right to all of Maia’s holdings as Maia1 does. And it definitely needs to be recognised that Maia2 possesses all the qualifications Maia did.
It needs to be recognised that Maia2 has as much right to all of Maia’s holdings as Maia1 does.
That’s a reasonable default assumption, but it also means you lose half your possessions every time you create a duplicate. I wouldn’t advise duplication until you previously wrote a will declaring what would happen to your belonging (mine would be something like “the original gets to keep everything”, and “if there is no way to determine which is the original, a copy is randomy chosen and considered to be the original”).
The problem with allowing such wills (and especially wills which allow specific reference to “the original”) is that there will be people who believe they are guaranteed to continue on solely as the original; and who will thus be willing to create copies who’re, well, slightly screwed.
You need a lot of protections for the copies. And laws regarding when copying is legal.
Why would such people have a motive for making copies in the first place?
This doesn’t need to be a hypothetical question. There are people who read this site, who subscribe to the thread theory of identity. If any of them are reading this comment: would you want to start copying yourself? If so, why? And what percentage of your assets would you allocate to the copy, and why?
I can see one possible answer: make a backup to start running only if I die. The backup wouldn’t be me, but would be able to take my place for the benefit of my family and friends, some of whom may subscribe to the pattern theory of identity. But that wouldn’t require the backup to be running concurrently.
Another possible answer: create a person who is not me but shares my goals, increasing the probability of those goals being fulfilled. But to be effective at this, the copy will probably need some resources. Do those of you who subscribe to the thread theory of identity, regard this as a useful thing to do?
If you create the backup at a single point and reuse it a potentially infinite number of times, then you become susceptible to the (for lack of a better term) “diverging Sleeping Beauty” scenario described above: you somehow have a uniform probability of waking up between now and the end of time, even though the probability of each specific point tends towards zero as “the end of time” approaches infinity.
Note that this paradox doesn’t arise in the classic Sleeping Beauty, even an indefinitely iterated version, because it’s constructed as a limit of finite probability distributions and thus always converges.
If you create the backup at incrementally increasing biological age, then at some point you’ll have to find a way to cheat death, or accept that your lifespan will be finite even with backups.
Possessions are one thing, but what about people around me? It’s not like each copy can receive its own set of parents, friends, love interest(s), etc.
Well, if we’ve posited the ability to duplicate people, then presumably they could. That would just exacerbate the situation, though, not resolve it.
That said, it’s not like I stop having my parents when I gain a sibling. If tomorrow there exist two copies of me, then both copies have the same parents, and my parents have a new son. So? What has anyone lost?
The same thing is even more true with friends. My friends have other friends, and that’s perfectly fine; why should it be less so if one of those other friends is identical to me?
Admittedly, if one is monogamous—or, more to the point, if one’s love interest(s) is (are) -- then a resource problem does exist.
That said, while I’m fairly commitedly monogamous in the real world, I suspect my attitudes on the matter would change in a world where personal identity can be duplicated freely; it would not surprise me if the same were true of my husband.
I agree that Maia2 is as qualified as Maia, but I’m not sure about legal identity. I guess I’m not sure what you mean by “fork”.
If the legal identity were the same, and Maia2 were to commit murder immediately after being made, should Maia1 be punished?
If Maia2 were to kill Maia1 immediately after creation, then is it just passing the baton so to speak? Would it just be Maia1 creating Maia2 with the intent of suicide? This could happen in say the lightspeed transportation scheme in which the information needed to construct Maia is sent far away to be constructed on Mars or Europa or something. Maia2 is made in the destination then Maia1 is destroyed, leading to one subjective Maia in the desired location.
By fork I mean, up to the point of duplication you have Maia. After the point of duplication you have Maia1 and Maia2, both of whom are Maia, but neither of whom are each other.
If the legal identity were the same, and Maia2 were to commit murder immediately after being made, should Maia1 be punished?
Did Maia, prior to duplication, intend the murder? If so, as both Maia1 and Maia2 are Maia, they’re both guilty of planning the murder. Only Maia2 committed it, but Maia1 planned it just the same.
If Maia2 were to kill Maia1 immediately after creation, then is it just passing the baton so to speak? Would it just be Maia1 creating Maia2 with the intent of suicide?
Maia1 didn’t exist seperately until Maia2 was created. There was Maia, who is the past of Maia1 and Maia2
Personally, I would advise forking the legal identity, rather than creating an entirely new one. It needs to be recognised that Maia2 has as much right to all of Maia’s holdings as Maia1 does. And it definitely needs to be recognised that Maia2 possesses all the qualifications Maia did.
That’s a reasonable default assumption, but it also means you lose half your possessions every time you create a duplicate. I wouldn’t advise duplication until you previously wrote a will declaring what would happen to your belonging (mine would be something like “the original gets to keep everything”, and “if there is no way to determine which is the original, a copy is randomy chosen and considered to be the original”).
The problem with allowing such wills (and especially wills which allow specific reference to “the original”) is that there will be people who believe they are guaranteed to continue on solely as the original; and who will thus be willing to create copies who’re, well, slightly screwed.
You need a lot of protections for the copies. And laws regarding when copying is legal.
Why would such people have a motive for making copies in the first place?
This doesn’t need to be a hypothetical question. There are people who read this site, who subscribe to the thread theory of identity. If any of them are reading this comment: would you want to start copying yourself? If so, why? And what percentage of your assets would you allocate to the copy, and why?
I can see one possible answer: make a backup to start running only if I die. The backup wouldn’t be me, but would be able to take my place for the benefit of my family and friends, some of whom may subscribe to the pattern theory of identity. But that wouldn’t require the backup to be running concurrently.
Another possible answer: create a person who is not me but shares my goals, increasing the probability of those goals being fulfilled. But to be effective at this, the copy will probably need some resources. Do those of you who subscribe to the thread theory of identity, regard this as a useful thing to do?
If you create the backup at a single point and reuse it a potentially infinite number of times, then you become susceptible to the (for lack of a better term) “diverging Sleeping Beauty” scenario described above: you somehow have a uniform probability of waking up between now and the end of time, even though the probability of each specific point tends towards zero as “the end of time” approaches infinity.
Note that this paradox doesn’t arise in the classic Sleeping Beauty, even an indefinitely iterated version, because it’s constructed as a limit of finite probability distributions and thus always converges.
If you create the backup at incrementally increasing biological age, then at some point you’ll have to find a way to cheat death, or accept that your lifespan will be finite even with backups.
Possessions are one thing, but what about people around me? It’s not like each copy can receive its own set of parents, friends, love interest(s), etc.
That’s more of a reason to not create copies in the first place.
Depends on your love interest(s), some might be thrilled to have several yous.
Well, if we’ve posited the ability to duplicate people, then presumably they could. That would just exacerbate the situation, though, not resolve it.
That said, it’s not like I stop having my parents when I gain a sibling. If tomorrow there exist two copies of me, then both copies have the same parents, and my parents have a new son. So? What has anyone lost?
The same thing is even more true with friends. My friends have other friends, and that’s perfectly fine; why should it be less so if one of those other friends is identical to me?
Admittedly, if one is monogamous—or, more to the point, if one’s love interest(s) is (are) -- then a resource problem does exist.
That said, while I’m fairly commitedly monogamous in the real world, I suspect my attitudes on the matter would change in a world where personal identity can be duplicated freely; it would not surprise me if the same were true of my husband.
I agree that Maia2 is as qualified as Maia, but I’m not sure about legal identity. I guess I’m not sure what you mean by “fork”.
If the legal identity were the same, and Maia2 were to commit murder immediately after being made, should Maia1 be punished?
If Maia2 were to kill Maia1 immediately after creation, then is it just passing the baton so to speak? Would it just be Maia1 creating Maia2 with the intent of suicide? This could happen in say the lightspeed transportation scheme in which the information needed to construct Maia is sent far away to be constructed on Mars or Europa or something. Maia2 is made in the destination then Maia1 is destroyed, leading to one subjective Maia in the desired location.
By fork I mean, up to the point of duplication you have Maia. After the point of duplication you have Maia1 and Maia2, both of whom are Maia, but neither of whom are each other.
Did Maia, prior to duplication, intend the murder? If so, as both Maia1 and Maia2 are Maia, they’re both guilty of planning the murder. Only Maia2 committed it, but Maia1 planned it just the same.
Maia1 didn’t exist seperately until Maia2 was created. There was Maia, who is the past of Maia1 and Maia2