My reasoning explicitly puts instrumental rationality ahead of epistemic. I hold this view precisely to the degree which I do in fact think it is helpful.
The extra category of a “fair bet” just adds another semantic disagreement between halfers and thirders.
It’s just a criterion by which to assess disagreements, not adding something more complicated to a model.
Regarding your remarks on these particular experiments:
If someone thinks the typical reward structure is some reward structure, then they’ll by default guess that a proposed experiment has that reward structure.
This reasonably can be expected to apply to halfers or thirders.
If you convince me that halfer reward structure is typical, I go halfer. (As previously stated since I favour the typical reward structure). To the extent that it’s not what I would guess by default, that’s precisely because I don’t intuitively feel that it’s typical and feel more that you are presenting a weird, atypical reward structure!
And thirder utilities are modified duringthe experiment. They are not just specified by a betting scheme, they go back and forth based on the knowledge state of the participant—behave the way probabilities are supposed to behave. And that’s because they are partially probabilities—a result of incorrect factorization of E(X).
Probability is a mathematical concept with very specific properties. In my previous post I talk about it specifically and show that thirder probabilities for Sleeping Beauty are ill-defined.
I’ve previously shown that some of your previous posts incorrectly model the Thirder perspective, but I haven’t carefully reviewed and critiqued all of your posts. Can you specify exactly what model of the Thirder viewpoint you are referencing here? (which will not only help me critique it but also help me determine what exactly you mean by the utilities changing in the first place, i.e. do you count Thirders evaluating the total utility of a possibility branch more highly when there are more of them as a “modification” or not (I would not consider this a “modification”).
My reasoning explicitly puts instrumental rationality ahead of epistemic. I hold this view precisely to the degree which I do in fact think it is helpful.
It’s just a criterion by which to assess disagreements, not adding something more complicated to a model.
Regarding your remarks on these particular experiments:
If someone thinks the typical reward structure is some reward structure, then they’ll by default guess that a proposed experiment has that reward structure.
This reasonably can be expected to apply to halfers or thirders.
If you convince me that halfer reward structure is typical, I go halfer. (As previously stated since I favour the typical reward structure). To the extent that it’s not what I would guess by default, that’s precisely because I don’t intuitively feel that it’s typical and feel more that you are presenting a weird, atypical reward structure!
I’ve previously shown that some of your previous posts incorrectly model the Thirder perspective, but I haven’t carefully reviewed and critiqued all of your posts. Can you specify exactly what model of the Thirder viewpoint you are referencing here? (which will not only help me critique it but also help me determine what exactly you mean by the utilities changing in the first place, i.e. do you count Thirders evaluating the total utility of a possibility branch more highly when there are more of them as a “modification” or not (I would not consider this a “modification”).