Equally importantly IMO, it argues for transfer from a context where the effect of your actions is directly perceptionally obvious to one where it is unclear and filters through political structures (e.g., aid organizations and what they choose to do and to communicate; any governments they might be interacting with; any other players on the ground in the distant country) that will be hard to model accurately.
My guess is that this has a relatively small effect on most people’s moral intuitions (though maybe it should have a larger effect—I don’t think I grok the implicit concern here). I’d be curious if there’s research bearing on this, and on the other speculations I tossed out there. (Or maybe Spencer or someone can go test it.)
Equally importantly IMO, it argues for transfer from a context where the effect of your actions is directly perceptionally obvious to one where it is unclear and filters through political structures (e.g., aid organizations and what they choose to do and to communicate; any governments they might be interacting with; any other players on the ground in the distant country) that will be hard to model accurately.
My guess is that this has a relatively small effect on most people’s moral intuitions (though maybe it should have a larger effect—I don’t think I grok the implicit concern here). I’d be curious if there’s research bearing on this, and on the other speculations I tossed out there. (Or maybe Spencer or someone can go test it.)
I have heard a number of people saying that they don’t want to give money to charity because they don’t trust the charities spend the money well.