Sure; comparative advantage (and sometimes just the belief in comparative advantage) creates polymorphism.
That is, if I identify as a dedicated truthseeker for whom social concerns are a mere distraction, I won’t learn social skills or practice them. If I identify as a dedicated socializer for whom the truth is irrelevant, I won’t learn rational skills or practice them. That sort of polarizing identification will create the kinds of socially incompetent truthseekers you describe.
But IME an epistemic predisposition for truth over falsehoods (which generally entails such virtues as curiosity and rigor and a willingness to question and so forth) sorts pretty independently with a social predisposition for respecting other people’s preferences (which generally entails such virtues as kindness and civility and a willingness to cooperate and so forth).
That is, I know plenty of people like you describe, who have the epistemic predisposition but lack the social one, and therefore end up asserting truths and challenging falsehoods without any consideration for other people’s preferences. And you’re right, as long as they keep doing that, they don’t make many friends.
But I also know plenty of people who lack both, and quite a few people who have the social but not the epistemic, and a few people who have both.
So I am not convinced that people with the epistemic predisposition (“truthseekers”) are any less likely to be socially successful than the general population, any more than attractive people are any less likely to be intelligent (or vice versa), any more than if I randomly choose a ball and a stick from two piles of 80 white items and 20 red ones, having a red ball makes me less likely to get a red stick.
That said, there seems to be a strong bias in popular culture towards assuming that they are (in all three cases, and many others)… a kind of belief in the conservation of luck, or something, where doing well in one lottery makes you somehow less likely to do well in others. (This is compensated for by a belief in “winning streaks,” but that’s less relevant when talking about genetic lotteries.)
Sure; comparative advantage (and sometimes just the belief in comparative advantage) creates polymorphism.
That is, if I identify as a dedicated truthseeker for whom social concerns are a mere distraction, I won’t learn social skills or practice them. If I identify as a dedicated socializer for whom the truth is irrelevant, I won’t learn rational skills or practice them. That sort of polarizing identification will create the kinds of socially incompetent truthseekers you describe.
But IME an epistemic predisposition for truth over falsehoods (which generally entails such virtues as curiosity and rigor and a willingness to question and so forth) sorts pretty independently with a social predisposition for respecting other people’s preferences (which generally entails such virtues as kindness and civility and a willingness to cooperate and so forth).
That is, I know plenty of people like you describe, who have the epistemic predisposition but lack the social one, and therefore end up asserting truths and challenging falsehoods without any consideration for other people’s preferences. And you’re right, as long as they keep doing that, they don’t make many friends.
But I also know plenty of people who lack both, and quite a few people who have the social but not the epistemic, and a few people who have both.
So I am not convinced that people with the epistemic predisposition (“truthseekers”) are any less likely to be socially successful than the general population, any more than attractive people are any less likely to be intelligent (or vice versa), any more than if I randomly choose a ball and a stick from two piles of 80 white items and 20 red ones, having a red ball makes me less likely to get a red stick.
That said, there seems to be a strong bias in popular culture towards assuming that they are (in all three cases, and many others)… a kind of belief in the conservation of luck, or something, where doing well in one lottery makes you somehow less likely to do well in others. (This is compensated for by a belief in “winning streaks,” but that’s less relevant when talking about genetic lotteries.)