It must kill you (at least make you unconscious) on a timescale shorter than that on which you can become aware of the outcome of the quantum coin-toss
It must be virtually certain to really kill you, not just injure you.
Both seem to be at odds with Many World Interpretation. In infinite number of those it will just injure you and/or you will become aware before, due to same malfuntion.
I’m not sure what you’re trying to draw from here, but I don’t think MWI requires an infinite number of possibilities.
What matters is in my interpretation of Tegmark’s view is that there are many many more cases (by infinite or finite measure) where it works properly than cases where it doesn’t.
Example:
499,999,999,999,000 cases cause death without observer experience
500,000,000,000,000 cases do nothing
1000 cases represent equipment failures
We should expect that the subject can predict for himself the do nothing case will occur with extremely high probability.
Both seem to be at odds with Many World Interpretation. In infinite number of those it will just injure you and/or you will become aware before, due to same malfuntion.
I’m not sure what you’re trying to draw from here, but I don’t think MWI requires an infinite number of possibilities.
What matters is in my interpretation of Tegmark’s view is that there are many many more cases (by infinite or finite measure) where it works properly than cases where it doesn’t.
Example: 499,999,999,999,000 cases cause death without observer experience 500,000,000,000,000 cases do nothing 1000 cases represent equipment failures
We should expect that the subject can predict for himself the do nothing case will occur with extremely high probability.