As someone leaning moral anti-realist, I learn roughly towards saying that it’s true but harmful. To be more nuanced, I don’t think its necessarily harmful to believe that moral preferences are like ordinary preferences but I do think that treating moral preferences like other preferences is a worse equilibrium.
If we could accept egoism without treating our own morals differently, then I wouldn’t have a problem with it. However, I think that a lot of the bad (more defection) parts of how we judge other people’s morals are intertwined with good (less defection) ways that we treat our own.
Can you elaborate on what you don’t understand about value drift applied to divergent starting values?
As someone leaning moral anti-realist, I learn roughly towards saying that it’s true but harmful. To be more nuanced, I don’t think its necessarily harmful to believe that moral preferences are like ordinary preferences but I do think that treating moral preferences like other preferences is a worse equilibrium.
If we could accept egoism without treating our own morals differently, then I wouldn’t have a problem with it. However, I think that a lot of the bad (more defection) parts of how we judge other people’s morals are intertwined with good (less defection) ways that we treat our own.
Can you elaborate on what you don’t understand about value drift applied to divergent starting values?