I’m not sure how one even begins to weigh the costs and benefits.
It’s not a trivial problem. But I think if I don’t at least attempt such a weighing, I’m not taking the problem seriously.
For my part, it makes no sense to me that the actual suffering should ever be valuable enough to want either to participate in it or to encourage others to do so. If having suffered through X is valuable, then I might encourage taking on the memory of having suffered through it, but that’s no reason to make them go through X. (Assuming, of course, that my communications technology is adequate to that task. If the only way I know to communicate suffering is to make others suffer, then my options are of course limited, but I ought to work on relaxing that limitation.)
All of the examples you give are of the benefits of the memories of suffering. I don’t need to currently be suffering to receive those benefits.
It’s not a trivial problem. But I think if I don’t at least attempt such a weighing, I’m not taking the problem seriously.
For my part, it makes no sense to me that the actual suffering should ever be valuable enough to want either to participate in it or to encourage others to do so. If having suffered through X is valuable, then I might encourage taking on the memory of having suffered through it, but that’s no reason to make them go through X. (Assuming, of course, that my communications technology is adequate to that task. If the only way I know to communicate suffering is to make others suffer, then my options are of course limited, but I ought to work on relaxing that limitation.)
All of the examples you give are of the benefits of the memories of suffering. I don’t need to currently be suffering to receive those benefits.