I agree with the thrust here, but it does seem that you’re conflating two different distinctions.
More specifically: you contrast explicit cognitive representations with implicit genetic representations (1), and it’s not always clear when you are talking about the distinction between implicit and explicit representations, and when you are talking about the difference between cognitive and genetic ones.
And it seems to matter: if I ask why my genetic representations aren’t recapitulated as cognitive ones, the kind of answer you give here is a fine one, but if I ask why my implicit representations aren’t recapitulated as explicit ones, that answer is insufficient. I am ignorant not only of what “my genes want,” but also of much of what “my brain wants,” and the stubborn implicitness of that second kind of information is not proximally due to evolution’s inability to quickly refactor code.
I don’t think any of that actually alters your main point, which is primarily about genetic vs. cognitive representations. Still, it’s worth emphasizing that not all cognitive representations are explicit ones, and there are good reasons for that over and above the genetic “godshatter” effect.
(1) I’m using “representation” here in a very loose way, admittedly.
I agree with the thrust here, but it does seem that you’re conflating two different distinctions.
More specifically: you contrast explicit cognitive representations with implicit genetic representations (1), and it’s not always clear when you are talking about the distinction between implicit and explicit representations, and when you are talking about the difference between cognitive and genetic ones.
And it seems to matter: if I ask why my genetic representations aren’t recapitulated as cognitive ones, the kind of answer you give here is a fine one, but if I ask why my implicit representations aren’t recapitulated as explicit ones, that answer is insufficient. I am ignorant not only of what “my genes want,” but also of much of what “my brain wants,” and the stubborn implicitness of that second kind of information is not proximally due to evolution’s inability to quickly refactor code.
I don’t think any of that actually alters your main point, which is primarily about genetic vs. cognitive representations. Still, it’s worth emphasizing that not all cognitive representations are explicit ones, and there are good reasons for that over and above the genetic “godshatter” effect.
(1) I’m using “representation” here in a very loose way, admittedly.