But my main problem is that there’s very little evidence getting utilons is actually increasing anybody’s happiness significantly.
If you give someone more utilons, and they do not get happier, you’re doing it wrong by definition. Conversely, someone cannot get happier without acquiring more utilons by definition.
You’ve rejected a straw man. You’re probably right to reject said straw man, but it doesn’t relate to utilitarianism.
If you give someone more utilons, and they do not get happier, you’re doing it wrong by definition. Conversely, someone cannot get happier without acquiring more utilons by definition.
Utilons are not equivalent to happiness. Utilons are basically defined as “whatever you care about,” while happiness is a specific brain state.
For example, I don’t want people to be tortured. If you save someone else from torture and don’t tell me about it, you’ve given me more utilons without increasing my happiness one bit.
The converse is true as well—you can make someone happier without giving them utilons. From what I know of Eliezer, if you injected him with heroin, you’d make him (temporarily) happier, but I doubt you’d have given him any utilons.
You caution against arguing by definition and yet claim definitions that are not universally agreed on as authoritative. There is genuine confusion over some of these definitions, it’s useful to try and clarify what you mean by the words but you should refrain from claiming that is the meaning. For example, contrary definitions of happiness (it’s not just a brain state):
state of well-being characterized by emotions ranging from contentment to intense joy
Good luck; good fortune; prosperity.
An agreeable feeling or condition of the soul arising from good fortune or propitious happening of any kind; the possession of those circumstances or that state of being which is attended enjoyment; the state of being happy; contentment; joyful satisfaction; felicity; blessedness.
Philosophers and religious thinkers have often defined happiness in terms of living a good life, or flourishing, rather than simply as an emotion. Happiness in this older sense was used to translate the Greek Eudaimonia, and is still used in virtue ethics.
I don’t think it’s uncontroversial to claim that utilons can be increased by actions you don’t know about either.
The definitions really are at issue here and there are relevant differences between commonly used definitions of happiness.
My understanding of utilitarian theory is that, at the highest meta level, every utilitarian theory is unified by the central goal of maximizing happiness, though the definitions, priorities, and rules may vary.
If this is true, “Utilitarianism fails to maximize happiness” is an illegitimate criticism of the meta-theory. It would be saying, “Maximizing happiness fails to maximize happiness,” which is definitionally impossible.
Since the meta-theory is “Maximize happiness,” you can’t say that the meta-theory fails to maximize happiness, only that specific formulations do, which is absolutely legitimate. The original author appears to be criticizing a specific formulation while he claims to be criticizing the meta-theory. That was my original point, and I did not make it clearly enough.
I used “by definition” precisely because I had just read that article. I’m clearly wrong because apparently the definition of utilons is controversial. I simply think of them as a convenient measurement device for happiness. If you have more utilons, you’re that much happier, and if you have fewer, you’re that much less happy. If buying that new car doesn’t increase your happiness, you derive zero utilons from it.
To my knowledge, that’s a legitimate and often-used definition of utilon. I could be wrong, in which case my definition is wrong, but given the fact that another poster takes issue with your definition, and that the original poster implicitly uses yet another definition, I really don’t think mine can be described as “wrong.” Though, of course, my original assertion that the OP is wrong by definition is wrong.
If you give someone more utilons, and they do not get happier, you’re doing it wrong by definition. Conversely, someone cannot get happier without acquiring more utilons by definition.
You’ve rejected a straw man. You’re probably right to reject said straw man, but it doesn’t relate to utilitarianism.
Utilons are not equivalent to happiness. Utilons are basically defined as “whatever you care about,” while happiness is a specific brain state.
For example, I don’t want people to be tortured. If you save someone else from torture and don’t tell me about it, you’ve given me more utilons without increasing my happiness one bit.
The converse is true as well—you can make someone happier without giving them utilons. From what I know of Eliezer, if you injected him with heroin, you’d make him (temporarily) happier, but I doubt you’d have given him any utilons.
Beware arguing by definition. Especially when your definition is wrong.
You caution against arguing by definition and yet claim definitions that are not universally agreed on as authoritative. There is genuine confusion over some of these definitions, it’s useful to try and clarify what you mean by the words but you should refrain from claiming that is the meaning. For example, contrary definitions of happiness (it’s not just a brain state):
Happiness
Wikipedia
I don’t think it’s uncontroversial to claim that utilons can be increased by actions you don’t know about either.
The definitions really are at issue here and there are relevant differences between commonly used definitions of happiness.
My understanding of utilitarian theory is that, at the highest meta level, every utilitarian theory is unified by the central goal of maximizing happiness, though the definitions, priorities, and rules may vary.
If this is true, “Utilitarianism fails to maximize happiness” is an illegitimate criticism of the meta-theory. It would be saying, “Maximizing happiness fails to maximize happiness,” which is definitionally impossible.
Since the meta-theory is “Maximize happiness,” you can’t say that the meta-theory fails to maximize happiness, only that specific formulations do, which is absolutely legitimate. The original author appears to be criticizing a specific formulation while he claims to be criticizing the meta-theory. That was my original point, and I did not make it clearly enough.
I used “by definition” precisely because I had just read that article. I’m clearly wrong because apparently the definition of utilons is controversial. I simply think of them as a convenient measurement device for happiness. If you have more utilons, you’re that much happier, and if you have fewer, you’re that much less happy. If buying that new car doesn’t increase your happiness, you derive zero utilons from it.
To my knowledge, that’s a legitimate and often-used definition of utilon. I could be wrong, in which case my definition is wrong, but given the fact that another poster takes issue with your definition, and that the original poster implicitly uses yet another definition, I really don’t think mine can be described as “wrong.” Though, of course, my original assertion that the OP is wrong by definition is wrong.