I don’t have access to the mind of me one second in the future or past either, so I don’t put much stock in continuity as something that I stand to lose.
You have access to your future mind in the sense that it is an evolution of your current mind. Your copy’s future mind is an evolution of your copy’s current mind, not yours.
Perhaps this tight causal link is what makes me care more about the mes that will branch off in the future more than I care about the past me of which I am a branch. Perhaps I would see a copy of myself as equivalent to me if we had at least sporadic direct access to each other’s mind states. So my skepticism toward immortality-through-backup-copies is not unconditional.
I don’t put much stock in continuity as something that I stand to lose.
You might not put much stock into that, and you might also be rationalizing away your basic will to live. What do you stand to lose?
You have access to your future mind in the sense that it is an evolution of your current mind. Your copy’s future mind is an evolution of your copy’s current mind, not yours.
My copy’s future mind is an evolution of me pre-copy’s current mind, and correlates overwhelmingly for a fairly long time after the copy was made. That means that making the copy is good for all me’s pre-copy and to some (large) degree even post-copy. I’d certainly be more willing to take risks if I had a backup. After all, what do I stand to lose? A few days of memory?
(I don’t see any situation, basically, crippling computing scarcity aside, in which I would be better off not uploading.)
To clarify: I don’t put stock into single-instance continuity. I want the future to have me’s in it, I don’t particularly care what their substrate is, or if they’re second-to-second continuous.
I don’t have access to the mind of me one second in the future or past either, so I don’t put much stock in continuity as something that I stand to lose.
You have access to your future mind in the sense that it is an evolution of your current mind. Your copy’s future mind is an evolution of your copy’s current mind, not yours.
Perhaps this tight causal link is what makes me care more about the mes that will branch off in the future more than I care about the past me of which I am a branch. Perhaps I would see a copy of myself as equivalent to me if we had at least sporadic direct access to each other’s mind states. So my skepticism toward immortality-through-backup-copies is not unconditional.
You might not put much stock into that, and you might also be rationalizing away your basic will to live. What do you stand to lose?
My copy’s future mind is an evolution of me pre-copy’s current mind, and correlates overwhelmingly for a fairly long time after the copy was made. That means that making the copy is good for all me’s pre-copy and to some (large) degree even post-copy. I’d certainly be more willing to take risks if I had a backup. After all, what do I stand to lose? A few days of memory?
(I don’t see any situation, basically, crippling computing scarcity aside, in which I would be better off not uploading.)
To clarify: I don’t put stock into single-instance continuity. I want the future to have me’s in it, I don’t particularly care what their substrate is, or if they’re second-to-second continuous.