It seems likely to me that such ‘friendly’ optimization processes will represent a subset of all possible optimization processes and that it is quite likely that some ‘non-friendly’ optimization processes will be better optimizers.
I agree that human values are unlikely to be the easiest to maximize. However, for another mind to optimize our universe, it needs to be created. This is why SIAI advocates creating an AI friendly to humans before other optimization processes are created.
It seems to me that your true objection to what I am saying is contained within the statement that “it is at the very least possible for an intelligence to not take over its immediate environment before another, with possibly inimical goals, is created.” Does this agree with your assessment? Would convincing argument for the intelligence explosion cause you to change your mind?
It seems to me that your true objection to what I am saying is contained within the statement that “it is at the very least possible for an intelligence to not take over its immediate environment before another, with possibly inimical goals, is created.” Does this agree with your assessment?
More or less, though I actually lean towards it being likely rather than merely possible. I am also making the related claim that a widely spatially dispersed entity with a single coherent goal system may be a highly unstable configuration.
Would convincing argument for the intelligence explosion cause you to change your mind?
On the first point, yes. I don’t believe I’ve seen my points addressed in detail, though it sounds like Eliezer’s debate with Robin Hanson that was linked earlier might cover the same ground. I will take some time to follow up on that later.
it sounds like Eliezer’s debate with Robin Hanson that was linked earlier might cover the same ground.
I’m working my way through it and indeed it does. Robin Hanson’s post Dreams of Autarky is close to my position. I think there are other computational, economic and physical arguments in this direction as well.
I agree that human values are unlikely to be the easiest to maximize. However, for another mind to optimize our universe, it needs to be created. This is why SIAI advocates creating an AI friendly to humans before other optimization processes are created.
It seems to me that your true objection to what I am saying is contained within the statement that “it is at the very least possible for an intelligence to not take over its immediate environment before another, with possibly inimical goals, is created.” Does this agree with your assessment? Would convincing argument for the intelligence explosion cause you to change your mind?
More or less, though I actually lean towards it being likely rather than merely possible. I am also making the related claim that a widely spatially dispersed entity with a single coherent goal system may be a highly unstable configuration.
On the first point, yes. I don’t believe I’ve seen my points addressed in detail, though it sounds like Eliezer’s debate with Robin Hanson that was linked earlier might cover the same ground. I will take some time to follow up on that later.
I’m working my way through it and indeed it does. Robin Hanson’s post Dreams of Autarky is close to my position. I think there are other computational, economic and physical arguments in this direction as well.