Good call. There being an Oxford Handbook of Rationality with a chapter on Bayesianism seems to show that the term is acquiring new connotations on a bit wider scope than just on LW.
Tangentially, looking through this, I note that it appears to address the circularity of basing utility on probability and probability on utility. It claims there’s a set of axioms that gets you both at once, and it’s due to Leonard Savage, 1954. How has this gone unmentioned here? I’m going to have to look up the details of this.
I think Eliezer can’t be reasonably accused of trying to redefine “rationality” and the problem is on the part of the Metafilter commenter. It seems easy enough to fix though. Just point them to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationality or http://books.google.com/books?id=PBftMFyTCR0C&lpg=PA3&dq=rationality&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=false
Good call. There being an Oxford Handbook of Rationality with a chapter on Bayesianism seems to show that the term is acquiring new connotations on a bit wider scope than just on LW.
Tangentially, looking through this, I note that it appears to address the circularity of basing utility on probability and probability on utility. It claims there’s a set of axioms that gets you both at once, and it’s due to Leonard Savage, 1954. How has this gone unmentioned here? I’m going to have to look up the details of this.
We need a decent “Bayesian epistemology” article on LW. The SEP one may suck. And EY’s “Intuitive Explanation” is, IME, nothing of the sort.