“Everything that is true is true because of some [logically] prior reason sufficient to make it true.”
Doesn’t that provide the structure to both justify and motivate going meta? It may not be precisely equivalent, but it seems pretty close. Intuitively, we expect going meta to produce more broadly applicable rulesets, rather than just a prior cause; but I have a feeling that’s simply a learned expectation because it usually does so; sufficient reasons ought to behave similarly.
I agree that PSR can justify one variety of “going meta”. I don’t agree that a practice of frequently “going meta” requires, or implies, any sort of PSR. I am prepared to be convinced, but so far it doesn’t seem that anyone who disagrees with me thinks it worth the effort of convincing me.
Doesn’t that provide the structure to both justify and motivate going meta? It may not be precisely equivalent, but it seems pretty close. Intuitively, we expect going meta to produce more broadly applicable rulesets, rather than just a prior cause; but I have a feeling that’s simply a learned expectation because it usually does so; sufficient reasons ought to behave similarly.
I agree that PSR can justify one variety of “going meta”. I don’t agree that a practice of frequently “going meta” requires, or implies, any sort of PSR. I am prepared to be convinced, but so far it doesn’t seem that anyone who disagrees with me thinks it worth the effort of convincing me.