If we accept the simulation hypothesis, then there are already gzillions of copies of us, being simulated under a wide variety of torture conditions (and other conditions, but torture seems to be the theme here). An extortionist in our world can only create a relatively small number of simulations of us, relatively small enough that it is not worth taking them into account. The distribution of simulation types in this world bears no relation to the distribution of simulations we could possibly be in.
If we want to gain information about what sort of simulation we are in, evidence needs to come directly from properties of our universe (stars twinkling in a weird way, messages embedded in π), rather than from properties of simulations nested in our universe.
The gzillions of other copies of you are not relevant unless they exist in universes exactly like yours from your observational perspective.
That being said, your point is interesting but just gets back to a core problem of the SA itself, which is how you count up the set of probable universes and properly weight them.
I think the correct approach is to project into the future of your multiverse, counting future worldlines that could simulate your current existence weighted by their probability.
So if it’s just one AI in a box and he doesn’t have much computing power you shouldn’t take him very seriously, but if it looks like this AI is going to win and control the future then you should take it seriously.
If we accept the simulation hypothesis, then there are already gzillions of copies of us, being simulated under a wide variety of torture conditions (and other conditions, but torture seems to be the theme here). An extortionist in our world can only create a relatively small number of simulations of us, relatively small enough that it is not worth taking them into account. The distribution of simulation types in this world bears no relation to the distribution of simulations we could possibly be in.
If we want to gain information about what sort of simulation we are in, evidence needs to come directly from properties of our universe (stars twinkling in a weird way, messages embedded in π), rather than from properties of simulations nested in our universe.
So I’m safe from the AI … for now.
That isn’t a strong implication of simulation, but is of MWI.
The gzillions of other copies of you are not relevant unless they exist in universes exactly like yours from your observational perspective.
That being said, your point is interesting but just gets back to a core problem of the SA itself, which is how you count up the set of probable universes and properly weight them.
I think the correct approach is to project into the future of your multiverse, counting future worldlines that could simulate your current existence weighted by their probability.
So if it’s just one AI in a box and he doesn’t have much computing power you shouldn’t take him very seriously, but if it looks like this AI is going to win and control the future then you should take it seriously.