No. It produces better outcomes. That’s the point.
Shouldn’t a perfect Bayesian always welcome new information?
The information is welcome. It just doesn’t make it sane to be blackmailed. Wei Dai’s formulation frames it as being ‘updateless’ but there is no requirement to refuse information. The reasoning is something you almost grasped when you used the description:
your point is that agents can simply opt out of or ignore acausal trades
Acausal trades are similar to normal trades. You only accept the good ones.
Litany of Tarski; if my action is counterproductive, I desire to believe that it is counterproductive.
Eliezer doesn’t get blackmailed in such situations. You do. Start your chant.
Worse still, isn’t the category “blackmail” arbitrary, intended to justify inaction rather than carve reality at it’s joints? What separates a precommitted!blackmailer from an honest bargainer in a standard acausal prisoner’s dilemma, offering to increase your utility by rescuing thousands of potential torture victims from the deathtrap created by another agent?
This has been covered elsewhere in this thread as well as plenty of other times on the the forum since you joined. The difference isn’t whether torture or destruction is happening. The distinction that matters is whether the blackmailer is doing something worse than their own Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement for the purpose of attempting to influence you.
If the UFAI gains benefit torturing people independently of influencing you but offers to stop in exchange for something then that isn’t blackmail. It is a trade that you consider like any other.
Acausal trades are similar to normal trades. You only accept the good ones.
[...]
Eliezer doesn’t get blackmailed in such situations.
The difference isn’t whether torture or destruction is happening. The distinction that matters is whether the blackmailer is doing something worse than their own Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement for the purpose of attempting to influence you.
Wedrifid, please don’t assume the conclusion. I know it’s a rather obvious conclusion, but dammit, we’re going to demonstrate it anyway.
The entire point of this discussion is addressing the idea that blackmailers can, perhaps, modify the Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement (although it wasn’t phrased like that.) Somewhat relevant when they can, presumably, self-modify, create new agents which will then trade with you, or maybe just act as if they had using TDT reasoning.
If you’re not interested in answering this criticism … well, fair enough. But I’d appreciate it if you don’t answer things out of context, it rather confuses things?
If you’re not interested in answering this criticism … well, fair enough. But I’d appreciate it if you don’t answer things out of context, it rather confuses things?
In the grandparent I directly answered both the immediate context (that was quoted) and the broader context. In particular I focussed on explaining the difference between an offer and a threat. That distinction is rather critical and also something you directly asked about.
It so happens that you don’t want there to be an answer to the rhetorical question you asked. Fortunately (for decision theorists) there is one in this case. There is a joint in reality here. It applies even to situations that don’t add in any confounding “acausal” considerations. Note that this is different to the challenging problem of distributing gains from trade. In those situations ‘negotiation’ and ‘extortion’ really are equivalent.
No. It produces better outcomes. That’s the point.
The information is welcome. It just doesn’t make it sane to be blackmailed. Wei Dai’s formulation frames it as being ‘updateless’ but there is no requirement to refuse information. The reasoning is something you almost grasped when you used the description:
Acausal trades are similar to normal trades. You only accept the good ones.
Eliezer doesn’t get blackmailed in such situations. You do. Start your chant.
This has been covered elsewhere in this thread as well as plenty of other times on the the forum since you joined. The difference isn’t whether torture or destruction is happening. The distinction that matters is whether the blackmailer is doing something worse than their own Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement for the purpose of attempting to influence you.
If the UFAI gains benefit torturing people independently of influencing you but offers to stop in exchange for something then that isn’t blackmail. It is a trade that you consider like any other.
Wedrifid, please don’t assume the conclusion. I know it’s a rather obvious conclusion, but dammit, we’re going to demonstrate it anyway.
The entire point of this discussion is addressing the idea that blackmailers can, perhaps, modify the Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement (although it wasn’t phrased like that.) Somewhat relevant when they can, presumably, self-modify, create new agents which will then trade with you, or maybe just act as if they had using TDT reasoning.
If you’re not interested in answering this criticism … well, fair enough. But I’d appreciate it if you don’t answer things out of context, it rather confuses things?
In the grandparent I directly answered both the immediate context (that was quoted) and the broader context. In particular I focussed on explaining the difference between an offer and a threat. That distinction is rather critical and also something you directly asked about.
It so happens that you don’t want there to be an answer to the rhetorical question you asked. Fortunately (for decision theorists) there is one in this case. There is a joint in reality here. It applies even to situations that don’t add in any confounding “acausal” considerations. Note that this is different to the challenging problem of distributing gains from trade. In those situations ‘negotiation’ and ‘extortion’ really are equivalent.